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ABSTRACT—Most accounts of the Supreme Court’s equal protection
jurisprudence describe the Court’s firm opposition to sex discrimination.
But while the Court famously invalidated several sex-based laws at the end
of the twentieth century, it also issued many other, less-celebrated
decisions that sanctioned sex-specific classifications in some
circumstances. Examining these long-ignored cases that approved of sex
discrimination, this Article explains how the Court’s rulings in this area
have often rejected the principle of formal equality in favor of broader
antisubordination concerns. Outlining a new model of equal protection that
authorizes certain forms of sex discrimination, (Un)Equal Protection
advocates for one particular discriminatory policy that could dramatically
promote gender equality in the decades to come. Fatherhood bonuses—
laws that give families additional parental leave when fathers stay at home
with their newborns—have the potential to drastically reorder gendered
divisions of labor and expand women’s workplace opportunities. Countries
that have experimented with fatherhood bonuses have seen women with
children spend more time in paid work, advance in their careers, and earn
higher wages. Applying these international models to the American
context, this Article explains why fatherhood bonuses would fit
comfortably within our constitutional framework, which authorizes
discriminatory policies when such policies support women’s public
participation. (Un)Equal Protection concludes by proposing a model for
fatherhood bonuses in the United States that would encourage more men to
perform care work, thereby advancing the goal of gender equality for both
sexes.
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INTRODUCTION
What if legal feminists got it all wrong? What if sex neutrality in the
law does not bring about gender equality after all? Many gender theorists
of the 1970s believed that their attacks on governmental sex classifications
would substantially curb sexual oppression.1 Challenging sex-based laws as
violations of equal protection, “sameness feminists” sought to ensure the
equal treatment of men and women in the public sphere through targeted
litigation.2 At the same time, however, “difference feminists” criticized the

1

See Joan C. Williams, Reconstructive Feminism: Changing the Way We Talk About Gender and
Work Thirty Years After the PDA, 21 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 79, 86–87 (2009) (summarizing the
history of the sameness–difference debate); see also Maxine Eichner, On Postmodern Feminist Legal
Theory, 36 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 32 (2001) (discussing the equal treatment approach to equality).
2
See generally Lucinda M. Finley, Transcending Equality Theory: A Way Out of the Maternity and
the Workplace Debate, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1118, 1121–22 (1986) (summarizing the strategy of
sameness feminism and questioning its value); see also David Cole, Strategies of Difference: Litigating
for Women’s Rights in a Man’s World, 2 LAW & INEQ. 33, 55 (1984) (examining litigation brought by
legal feminists).
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sameness approach for ignoring women’s lived realities.3 Arguing in favor
of gender-specific policies such as paid maternity leave, difference
feminists asserted that the law must take into account the costs that women
disproportionately bear in society due to pregnancy and caregiving.4
After a series of historic Supreme Court decisions that adopted a sexneutral approach to discrimination, sameness feminists declared victory.5
Pointing to Supreme Court rulings that struck down distinctions in
education, estate administration, and public benefits, among others, they
argued that the Court’s aversion to governmental sex classifications
signaled the demise of special treatment for women both as a matter of law
and as a matter of policy.6
Today, however, with women still lagging far behind men in earnings,
wealth, and social power, it is time to acknowledge the limitations of the
sameness approach.7 Even though women have enjoyed formal equality
under the law for decades—a central goal of sameness feminism—the glass
ceiling remains stubbornly difficult to break. Although women’s workforce
numbers and academic accomplishments grow, they still command much
lower wages than men and remain significantly underrepresented at the
highest corporate rungs.8 Contrary to the popular claim that society is
witnessing an “End of Men,”9 women today actually earn less than eighty
3

See MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND AMERICAN
LAW 211–14, 229–39 (1990) [hereinafter MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE] (discussing debates
within legal feminism); Ann C. McGinley, Work, Caregiving, and Masculinities, 34 SEATTLE U. L.
REV. 703, 703–04 (2011) (summarizing various critiques offered by difference feminists).
4
For a detailed discussion of the sameness–difference debate, see infra Part II.A and
accompanying discussion.
5
See generally Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Scholarship: A History Through the Lens of
the California Law Review, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 381, 391–92 (2012); Deborah Dinner, The Costs of
Reproduction: History and the Legal Construction of Sex Equality, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 415,
444 (2011) (summarizing the common claim that “by 1970, sameness feminism had won”).
6
Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 726 (1982); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S.
677, 679–81 (1973); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971); see also Joan Williams, Do Women Need
Special Treatment? Do Feminists Need Equality?, 9 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 279, 279–80 (1998)
(examining the rise of formal equality).
7
See Cynthia Grant Bowman & Elizabeth M. Schneider, Feminist Legal Theory, Feminist
Lawmaking, and the Legal Profession, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 249, 251–54 (1998) (summarizing
critiques of sameness feminism); Julie C. Suk, Are Gender Stereotypes Bad for Women? Rethinking
Antidiscrimination Law and Work-Family Conflict, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 58–59 (2010) (discussing
the gender wage gap).
8
See Kelli K. García, The Gender Bind: Men as Inauthentic Caregivers, 20 DUKE J. GENDER L. &
POL’Y 1, 25 (2012) (discussing leadership and gender); Debbie N. Kaminer, The Work-Family Conflict:
Developing a Model of Parental Accommodation in the Workplace, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 305, 312–14
(2004) (examining the gender wage gap).
9
See generally MAUREEN DOWD, ARE MEN NECESSARY?: WHEN SEXES COLLIDE 135–66 (2006);
HANNA ROSIN, THE END OF MEN: AND THE RISE OF WOMEN 4–5 (2012) (discussing workplace gains
made by women).
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percent of men’s wages and constitute less than five percent of Fortune 500
CEOs.10 In sum, despite the promises of sameness feminism, formal
equality in law has not yet yielded actual equality for working women.
If women are to overcome the remaining barriers that continue to
divide the sexes, a new vision of equality is needed. This new model of
equality must build upon existing debates within legal feminism while
finally bringing men into the conversation. Until now, men have stood on
the sidelines of the sameness–difference debate, appearing almost
irrelevant to the discussion.11 Yet the barriers that hold women back at
work today have less to do with whether laws facially discriminate against
women (few do) and more to do with men’s failure to assume equal
divisions of labor at home.12
Although men have made some strides on the domestic front, women
still perform the vast majority of childcare and housework in the United
States.13 These longstanding patterns of gendered behavior ultimately
constrain women’s workplace opportunities. Once they have children, most
women take maternity leave, perform the majority of care work at home,
and suffer lasting career damage as a result.14 In contrast, most men forego
paternity leave, return to work, and pursue their careers unencumbered by
familial obligations.15

10

AM. ASS’N OF UNIV. WOMEN, THE SIMPLE TRUTH ABOUT THE GENDER PAY GAP 3 (2013),
available at http://www.aauw.org/files/2013/03/The-Simple-Truth-Fall-2013.pdf [http://perma.cc/V38T
-WGDJ]; Women CEOs of the Fortune 1000, CATALYST (June 10, 2014), http://www.catalyst.org/
knowledge/women-ceos-fortune-1000 [http://perma.cc/73D9-BT2Y].
11
See Nancy E. Dowd, Masculinities and Feminist Legal Theory, 23 WIS. J.L. GENDER & SOC’Y
201, 212–13 (2008) (asserting that much of feminist discourse omits men as subjects of gender
analysis).
12
Kari Palazzari, The Daddy Double-Bind: How the Family and Medical Leave Act Perpetuates
Sex Inequality Across All Class Levels, 16 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 429, 436–37 (2007) (discussing
divisions of household labor); Joan C. Williams, Jumpstarting the Stalled Gender Revolution: Justice
Ginsburg and Reconstructive Feminism, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 1267, 1283 (2012) (attributing the stalled
gender revolution to differences in household contributions and wage work).
13
KIM PARKER & WENDY WANG, PEW RESEARCH CTR., MODERN PARENTHOOD: ROLES OF MOMS
AND DADS CONVERGE AS THEY BALANCE WORK AND FAMILY 1 (2013), available at
http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/files/2013/03/FINAL_modern_parenthood_03-2013.pdf [http://perma.
cc/7KDY-HCFS] (reporting that mothers spend twice the number of hours per week on childcare as
fathers); WENDY WANG, PEW RESEARCH CTR., PARENTS’ TIME WITH KIDS MORE REWARDING THAN
PAID WORK—AND MORE EXHAUSTING 2 (2013), available at http://www.pewsocialtrends.org
/files/2013/10/parental-time-use_10-2013.pdf [http://perma.cc/339J-SG5P] (discussing the average
number of hours that mothers and fathers spend per week on childcare and housework).
14
See Harry Brighouse & Erik Olin Wright, Strong Gender Egalitarianism, 36 POL. & SOC’Y 360,
366 (2008) (arguing that employers expect women to experience more workplace departures than men);
Michael Selmi, The Limited Vision of the Family and Medical Leave Act, 44 VILL. L. REV. 395, 403–04
(1999) (explaining how employers rely upon group information to make employment determinations).
15
See Joanna L. Grossman, Job Security Without Equality: The Family and Medical Leave Act of
1993, 15 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 17, 35 (2004) (discussing male use of parental leave); Michael Selmi,
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Men’s reluctance to perform care work impacts every working woman,
not simply mothers. Even young women and women who have no intention
of having children feel the labor market effects that result from uneven
divisions of household labor. Whether they have children or not, all women
suffer from “maternal profiling”—the employer perception that women
eventually will reduce their workplace commitment because of the children
they currently have or those they will someday bear.16 Given the cultural
force behind the concept of maternal care and the fact that women actually
take far more family leave than men, many employers assume that young
women pose a higher risk of exiting the labor force in comparison to
similarly situated men.17 Because female applicants cannot signal their
intention not to have children, certain employers may view all young
women as riskier hires.18 Men will continue to reap the workplace benefits
that flow from these presumptions until they significantly increase their
leave-taking behavior, thereby diminishing employers’ underlying basis for
engaging in maternal profiling.
As difference feminists predicted, sex-neutral solutions to problems
related to caregiving and family leave can yield sex-skewed results. But a
new form of special treatment for fathers could radically disrupt this
dynamic. Fatherhood bonuses—policies that give families additional weeks
of paid leave if fathers stay at home with their newborns19—help facilitate
coequal parenting, thereby reducing the damage maternal profiling
causes.20 In Germany, for example, men’s use of paternity leave increased
eightfold after the country recently implemented fatherhood bonuses.21

Family Leave and the Gender Wage Gap, 78 N.C. L. REV. 707, 755–59 (2000) (considering the reasons
why few men take extended periods of parental leave).
16
See Rangita de Silva de Alwis, Examining Gender Stereotypes in New Work/Family
Reconciliation Policies: The Creation of a New Paradigm for Egalitarian Legislation, 18 DUKE J.
GENDER L. & POL’Y 305, 313–14 (2011) (discussing the effects of family responsibilities
discrimination); Grant Barrett, All We Are Saying, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 2007, at C3 (defining
“maternal profiling” as “[e]mployment discrimination against a woman who has, or will have,
children”).
17
See Kaminer, supra note 8, at 313–14 (discussing the working patterns of each sex); Palazzari,
supra note 12, at 436–37 (examining divisions of labor between the sexes).
18
See Samuel Issacharoff & Elyse Rosenblum, Women and the Workplace: Accommodating the
Demands of Pregnancy, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2154, 2169 (1994) (discussing maternal profiling).
19
INT’L NETWORK ON LEAVE POLICIES & RESEARCH, INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF LEAVE
POLICIES AND RELATED RESEARCH 2013 17 (Peter Moss ed., 2013), available at http://www.
leavenetwork.org/fileadmin/Leavenetwork/Annual_reviews/2013_complete.6june.pdf [http://perma.cc/
8TG9-R9MQ] (discussing the benefits of individualizing entitlements for fathers).
20
See de Silva de Alwis, supra note 16, at 326–27 (describing European father-based incentives).
21
See INT’L NETWORK ON LEAVE POLICIES & RESEARCH, supra note 19, at 36 (reporting that
German men’s use of paternity leave increased from 3.3 percent in 2006 to 27.8 percent in the third
quarter of 2011); see also Andrea Doucet, For Equality, Take Fathers into Account, N.Y. TIMES, June
14, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/07/05/how-can-we-get-men-to-do-more-at-

5

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

Likewise, jurisdictions such as Québec, Norway, Sweden, and Spain have
enacted leave laws that incentivize father care.22 When this happens—that
is, when men stay home with their babies even for relatively short periods
of time—tectonic shifts begin to occur at work and at home: women spend
more time in paid work, earn higher wages, and advance in their careers.23
Meanwhile, leave-taking men perform a greater share of housework and
spend less time at the office long after their parental leave ends.24
Fatherhood bonuses in the United States would represent a form of
governmental sex discrimination by favoring men over women.
Nevertheless, they would fit comfortably within a constitutional framework
that tolerates certain forms of sex discrimination. In order to understand
why, this Article takes a fresh look at the Supreme Court’s sex equality
cases. The conventional wisdom in this area holds that the Court has
remained doggedly committed to formal equality in its constitutional sex
discrimination rulings since the 1970s.25 Yet this oversimplified take on the
Court’s equal protection jurisprudence ignores the numerous instances in
which the Court has allowed many sex-based laws to withstand judicial

home/for-gender-equality-take-fathers-into-account [http://perma.cc/ZT6K-K59W] (discussing changes
in caregiving patterns among German parents).
22
INT’L NETWORK ON LEAVE POLICIES & RESEARCH, supra note 19, at 12–15, 37–38; DianeGabrielle Tremblay, More Time for Daddy: Québec Leads the Way with Its New Parental Leave Policy,
18 OUR SCHOOLS/OUR SELVES 223, 226 (2009) (discussing Québec’s system); Katrin Bennhold, In
Sweden, Men Can Have It All, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/10/world/
europe/10iht-sweden.html [http://perma.cc/XJ5V-V9C4] (summarizing policies in Sweden and
Germany); see also Janet C. Gornick & Marcia K. Meyers, Creating Gender Egalitarian Societies: An
Agenda for Reform, 36 POL. & SOC’Y 313, 331 (2008) (stating that fathers’ take-up rates rose
significantly after implementation of fatherhood bonuses).
23
See Elly-Ann Johansson, The Effect of Own and Spousal Parental Leave on Earnings 1–29 (Inst.
for Labour Mkt. Policy Evaluation, Working Paper No. 2010:4, 2010) (finding that fathers’ use of
paternity leave positively correlated with maternal earnings); Ankita Patnaik, Reserving Time for
Daddy: The Short and Long-Run Consequences of Fathers’ Quotas 3–4 (Oct. 14, 2014) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with Cornell University) (discussing the effects of father-targeted leave on mothers
in Québec).
24
See Patnaik, supra note 23, at 11 (noting that couples exposed to paternity leave reforms
exhibited less “sex specialization” in performing household tasks); see also Nevena Zhelyazkova,
Fathers’ Use of Parental Leave. What Do We Know? 26 (Maastricht Econ. & Soc. Research Inst. on
Innovation & Tech. (UNU-MERIT), Working Paper No. 2013-022, 2013) (summarizing research on the
benefits of increased male participation in parental leave policies).
25
See generally Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All: Sex, Race, and Equal Protection,
61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1003, 1010–11 (1986) (discussing scholarship on the Supreme Court’s
antidifferentiation approach to law); Neil S. Siegel & Reva B. Siegel, Struck by Stereotype: Ruth Bader
Ginsburg on Pregnancy Discrimination as Sex Discrimination, 59 DUKE L.J. 771, 774–75 (2010)
(summarizing feminist critiques of Ruth Bader Ginsburg); Williams, supra note 6, at 279–80
(discussing the special treatment/equal treatment debate).
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scrutiny.26 The Article explains how these overlooked cases provide the
constitutional basis for justifying the use of fatherhood bonuses.
Standing somewhere in the soft middle between rational basis review
and strict scrutiny, the constitutional test for illegal sex discrimination
depends on whether a sex classification substantially advances an important
governmental objective.27 As the Supreme Court has made clear in its more
recent case law in this area, policies that rely on harmful, gender-based
stereotypes will fail this test.28 Conversely, the Court has approved of
special treatment laws that favor one sex over the other when they
effectively confront age-old gender stereotypes and advance an
antisubordination agenda.29 This Article explains why fatherhood bonuses
would achieve both ends.
The study of masculinities informs the constitutional inquiry by
highlighting the stereotypes that fatherhood bonuses would confront.
Masculinities theory—an interdisciplinary field of gender studies that did
not exist during the 1970s when the Supreme Court forged its modern line
of sex equality cases—explains how male identity is formed through a
complex set of gender-based expectations.30 In contrast to certain strands of
legal feminism that tend to depict men solely as static objects of
domination,31 masculinities theory attempts to understand men as gendered
beings who are simultaneously privileged and subordinated by
masculinity.32 Drawing from this relatively new body of gender theory, this
Article explains how the rules of manhood call on men to avoid care work,
thereby saddling women with domestic chores. When applied to the
Supreme Court’s test for permissible instances of special treatment, the
26

See, e.g., Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987); Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v.
Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 (1987); Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419
U.S. 498 (1975); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974).
27
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
28
See Coleman v. Court of Appeals of Md., 132 S. Ct. 1327, 1334–35 (2012) (plurality opinion);
Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 731 (2003); United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515,
542–46 (1996).
29
See, e.g., Califano, 430 U.S. at 318 (approving of sex-based classifications to combat “the
socialization process of a male-dominated culture” (quoting Kahn, 416 U.S. at 353)).
30
See Michael Kimmel, Foreword to MASCULINITIES AND THE LAW: A MULTIDIMENSIONAL
APPROACH, at xiv (Frank Rudy Cooper & Ann C. McGinley eds., 2012) (discussing the history of
masculinities theory); Ann C. McGinley, Ricci v. DeStefano: A Masculinities Theory Analysis,
33 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 581, 585–87 (2010) (outlining the basic features of masculinities theory).
31
JOAN C. WILLIAMS, RESHAPING THE WORK-FAMILY DEBATE: WHY MEN AND CLASS MATTER
144 (2010) (critiquing dominance feminism’s failure to distinguish between men and masculinity);
Dowd, supra note 11, at 204 (commenting on the essentialized depiction of men); Nancy Levit,
Feminism for Men: Legal Ideology and the Construction of Maleness, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1037, 1049–51
(1996) (discussing the limited role men play in postmodern feminism).
32
See NANCY E. DOWD, THE MAN QUESTION: MALE SUBORDINATION AND PRIVILEGE 2–3 (2010)
(describing the “power, privilege, and the burdens of masculinity”).
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study of masculinities helps explain how men’s gender performances harm
women, and why fatherhood bonuses satisfy the antistereotyping,
antisubordination principles expressed in the Court’s equal protection
jurisprudence.
This Article advances the case for fatherhood bonuses in four parts.
Part I explains the nature of maternal profiling and how certain countries
have enacted fatherhood bonuses to combat this form of bias against both
mothers and childless women. Part II considers fatherhood bonuses in light
of feminist theory and the Supreme Court’s often ignored cases that
sanctioned sex discrimination. This Part demonstrates how the Supreme
Court’s focus on remediation, subordination, and stereotypes in its equal
protection rulings leaves room for certain discriminatory laws that extend
legal rights exclusively to men to expand workplace opportunities for
women. Part III brings the study of masculinities into the discussion by
explaining why the problems created by masculine stereotypes demand
gender-specific solutions. Finally, Part IV offers a sketch of how
fatherhood bonuses could operate in the U.S. context. Unlike the statebased grants of Europe, a U.S. system must draw from the American values
of autonomy and choice in its design and implementation. To that end, a
father-targeted policy ought to incentivize male caregiving without
imposing disproportionate costs on employers, beneficiaries, and childless
employees. The American approach must account for different parental
arrangements, such as single parents and same-sex couples, while making
the broader case to childless workers that by combatting maternal profiling,
fatherhood bonuses advance the goal of gender equality for all workers.33
The Supreme Court has made clear that sex discrimination is not
always illegal discrimination.34 In limited circumstances, the Court will
sanction policies that combat sex-based biases even if the policies
themselves are discriminatory. Father-targeted leave is one such policy.
Even though women continue to make tremendous workplace strides,
domestic responsibilities still hamper their progress at work. These trends
will not end until men receive sufficient incentives to assume a greater
share of domestic chores. In short, after all the debates over whether to
extend special treatment or equal treatment to women, it turns out that
gender equality depends on extending preferential treatment to men.

33

Brighouse & Wright, supra note 14, at 366 (discussing employers’ views of childless women).
See, e.g., Kahn, 416 U.S. at 356 n.10 (“Gender has never been rejected as an impermissible
classification in all instances.”).
34
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PROMOTING WOMEN’S PUBLIC PARTICIPATION WITH
FATHERHOOD BONUSES

It might appear that women are finally beating men at their own game.
Where men once dominated the workplace, women now earn more degrees
than men, hold more management positions, and constitute a majority of
professionals.35 Despite these important advancements, however, other
facts paint a different picture. For example, full-time working women still
earn about twenty percent less than men each year—a number that barely
has changed over the last decade.36 In addition, they constitute a small
minority of executives at large U.S. companies, represent just fifteen
percent of equity partners at large law firms, and account for less than
twenty percent of Congress.37 Thus, even with the rise of women at work,
men still command higher wages in the marketplace and control most of
society’s levers of power.38
The gender revolution of the 1970s began to stall in the 1990s and has
not recovered since.39 In fact, women’s overall workforce participation has
not increased in two decades, and the percentage of U.S. mothers working
outside the home has decreased since 1999.40 Today, the primary obstacle
35

BRAD HARRINGTON ET AL., BOS. COLL. CTR. FOR WORK & FAMILY, THE NEW DAD: CARING,
COMMITTED AND CONFLICTED 3 (2011), available at http://www.bc.edu/content/dam/files/centers/cwf/
pdf/FH-Study-Web-2.pdf
[http://perma.cc/3AQK-6JV3]
(discussing
women’s
educational
accomplishments); U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, WOMEN IN THE LABOR FORCE: A DATABOOK
2 (2013), available at http://www.bls.gov/cps/wlf-databook-2013.pdf [http://perma.cc/EL5J-V2HF]
(listing women’s workplace participation rates); Katie Ziegler, Hitting the Glass Dome, ST.
LEGISLATURES, July/Aug. 2009, at 30 (describing gains made by women in law, medicine, business,
and politics).
36
INST. FOR WOMEN’S POLICY RESEARCH, THE GENDER WAGE GAP: 2012, at 1–2 (2013),
available at http://www.iwpr.org/publications/pubs/the-gender-wage-gap-2012 [http://perma.cc/95UXMBGX].
37
CTR. FOR AM. WOMEN & POLITICS, WOMEN IN THE U.S. CONGRESS 2014 1 (2014), available at
http://www.cawp.rutgers.edu/fast_facts/levels_of_office/documents/cong.pdf [http://perma.cc/PDR4WW5X]; Vivia Chen, The Equity Gap: Survey Shows Slow Progress for Women Partners at Big Firms,
NAT’L L.J., July 23, 2012, at 1; Women CEOs of the Fortune 1000, supra note 10 (discussing women’s
representation at Fortune 500 companies).
38
See CHRYSTIA FREELAND, PLUTOCRATS: THE RISE OF THE NEW GLOBAL SUPER-RICH AND THE
FALL OF EVERYONE ELSE 85 (2012) (discussing men’s ongoing dominance in upper management).
39
See ARLIE RUSSELL HOCHSCHILD WITH ANNE MACHUNG, THE SECOND SHIFT (2003); Williams,
supra note 12, at 1283 (discussing the relationship between women’s workforce participation and men’s
household contributions).
40
See D’VERA COHN, PEW RESEARCH CTR., AFTER DECADES OF DECLINE, A RISE IN STAY-ATHOME MOTHERS 5 (2014), available at http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/files/2014/04/Moms-AtHome_04-08-2014.pdf [http://perma.cc/6CKE-5B2B] (reporting that the share of mothers who do not
work outside the home increased from twenty-three percent to twenty-nine percent between 1999 and
2012); NEIL GILBERT, A MOTHER’S WORK: HOW FEMINISM, THE MARKET, AND POLICY SHAPE FAMILY
LIFE 14–16 (2008); Family Leave—U.S., Canada, and Global, CATALYST (Mar. 22, 2013),
http://www.catalyst.org/knowledge/family-leave-us-canada-and-global [http://perma.cc/JXR8-5VNL];
(discussing gender-based workforce departures); see also Stephanie Coontz, Progress at Work, but
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holding women back at work is not a “glass ceiling” but a “maternal wall,”
a barrier that casts a shadow over all female workers, including childless
women.41
A. Caregiving and Maternal Profiling
Most women’s careers flatline the moment they have children. A
comparison of the wages earned by mothers and others best captures this
fact. Today, young men and women without children make roughly the
same amount of money.42 In fact, childless women in their twenties now
earn more than men in the vast majority of U.S. cities.43 But as parenthood
approaches, these trends reverse. The pay gap between men and women
becomes dramatically wider around the age of thirty-five, which for many
women is the moment when the demands of childcare, parental leave, and
career advancement converge.44
Domesticity—the belief that women should bear the brunt of domestic
responsibilities and childcare obligations—still influences a great deal of
each sex’s parenting behaviors.45 Even though many women feel
ambivalent about motherhood and the caregiving imperatives associated
with that role, domesticity places a cultural expectation on all women to
downgrade their market work and become the caregiving center of their
families’ lives once they have children.46 In fact, the majority of women
adhere to this norm by departing from the workforce in whole or in part
after they become mothers.47

Mothers Still Pay a Price, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2013, at SR5 (reviewing data related to women’s
workplace progress over the past half-century).
41
See Joan C. Williams & Nancy Segal, Beyond the Maternal Wall: Relief for Family Caregivers
Who Are Discriminated Against on the Job, 26 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 77, 77 (2003) (discussing
motherhood and the glass ceiling).
42
See Katharine B. Silbaugh, Deliverable Male, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 733, 736 (2011) (“[U]ntil
burdened by parenthood, women have closed the wage gap.”).
43
JUNE E. O’NEILL & DAVE M. O’NEILL, THE DECLINING IMPORTANCE OF RACE AND GENDER IN
THE LABOR MARKET: THE ROLE OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION POLICIES 239 (2012) (discussing
childless women’s earnings); Richard Dorment, Why Men Still Can’t Have It All, ESQUIRE, June/July
2013, at 126.
44
AM. ASS’N OF UNIV. WOMEN, supra note 10, at 12–13 (explaining how the pay gap differs by
age). See generally Rachel Arnow-Richman, Accommodation Subverted: The Future of Work/Family
Initiatives in a “Me, Inc.” World, 12 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 345, 352–53 (2003) (examining the
relationship between women’s caregiving and workplace barriers).
45
See de Silva de Alwis, supra note 16, at 308 (discussing domesticity’s restrictive features).
46
See Lindsay R. B. Dickerson, “Your Wife Should Handle It”: The Implicit Messages of the
Family and Medical Leave Act, 25 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 429, 433–34 (2005) (reviewing SUSAN J.
DOUGLAS & MEREDITH W. MICHAELS, THE MOMMY MYTH: THE IDEALIZATION OF MOTHERHOOD AND
HOW IT HAS UNDERMINED ALL WOMEN 204–10 (2004)) (discussing domesticity in the media).
47
See generally Williams, supra note 12, at 1283 (examining the labor market effects of
motherhood).
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Many employers observe these behaviors and expect that all female
candidates will someday reduce their workplace involvement, regardless of
the actual intent or behavior of any individual female worker.48 Scholars
dub this form of bias “statistical discrimination” and describe it as a
rational form of decisionmaking due to its relative validity in predicting the
behaviors of most women.49 In a world in which employers seek to sort job
applicants using convenient proxies, maternal profiling enables businesses
to gauge the input costs that the average woman tends to generate for her
group.50
The primary victims of maternal profiling, of course, are mothers
themselves whom employers assume lack the same level of workplace
commitment as childless workers.51 Consistent with this presumption, a
number of social science experiments have demonstrated that once women
have children, employers extend them fewer promotions and other
workplace rewards.52 The most famous laboratory experiment on this topic
presented a group of employers with the résumés of two women applying
for marketing positions and asked the employers whether they would hire
each applicant.53 Each woman’s résumé was functionally identical to the
other; however, one listed the applicant’s parental status and PTA work,
while the other résumé listed the woman’s marital status and work in the
local neighborhood association.54 In other words, one applicant was a
mother, while the other was not. Even though the résumés were the same in
all other respects, eighty-four percent of employers offered the childless
woman a job, while only forty-seven percent of employers agreed to hire
the equally qualified mother.55 Likewise, the employers offered the mother
an average of $11,000 less in starting salary.56

48

See Selmi, supra note 15, at 744–45 (explaining how employers rely on group observations).
See Dickerson, supra note 46, at 443–44 (discussing the function of statistical discrimination).
50
See Mark Kelman, Market Discrimination and Groups, 53 STAN. L. REV. 833, 834–38 (2001)
(arguing that the law ought to restrict only “market-irrational” discrimination).
51
See Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, Men at Work, Fathers at Home: Uncovering the Masculine
Face of Caregiver Discrimination, 24 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 253, 261–62 (2013) (discussing family
responsibilities discrimination).
52
Stephen Benard et al., Cognitive Bias and the Motherhood Penalty, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 1359, 1359
(2008) (summarizing studies related to “maternal wall” discrimination); Joan C. Williams & Stephanie
Bornstein, The Evolution of “FReD”: Family Responsibilities Discrimination and Developments in the
Law of Stereotyping and Implicit Bias, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 1311, 1327–28 (2008) (same).
53
Shelley J. Correll et al., Getting a Job: Is There a Motherhood Penalty?, 112 AM. J. SOC. 1297,
1309–12 (2007).
54
Id. at 1313.
55
Id. at 1316 (noting that employers judged mothers as significantly less competent than childless
women).
56
Id.
49
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Beyond the negative effects of statistical discrimination on mothers,
however, even childless women suffer from the perception that at some
point in the future they will perform the bulk of their family’s work.
Because statistical discrimination is based on an employee’s likely
behaviors, employers project expected actions onto group members even if
individual members of that group have no intention of conforming to the
group norm.57 Given that maternal profiling masks over distinctions among
group members, employers may even view childless women as risky
employees who will someday assume excessive caregiving duties.58 As
such, the harm of maternal profiling extends not only to women with
children, but also to any woman of childbearing years.
B. The Failure of Gender-Neutral Leave in the United States
Despite Americans’ general skepticism of governmental interventions
in the domestic sphere,59 Congress passed the Family and Medical Leave
Act (FMLA) as an explicit, policy-based attempt to combat maternal
profiling by encouraging greater gender equity in the home.60 Enacted in
1993, the FMLA contained legislative findings that noted women’s
disproportionate caregiving burdens and the widespread discrimination that
flowed from domesticity.61 By extending family leave to both men and
women, Congress attempted to remove the target that sat squarely on
women’s backs as the sole users of parental leave.62
Unfortunately, twenty years of experience demonstrates that the
FMLA has done little to break longstanding sex-based patterns of care in
the United States. Recent data on men’s and women’s leave-taking rates
show how gender-based norms continue to dictate caregiving behaviors.
Today the average father in the United States leaves work for one week or
less following his child’s birth or adoption.63 In contrast, new mothers take
nearly two months more parental leave than fathers.64 These initial
57

See Kaminer, supra note 8, at 313–14 (discussing each sex’s working patterns); Palazzari, supra
note 12, at 436–37 (examining sex-based divisions of labor).
58
See Brighouse & Wright, supra note 14, at 366 (outlining gender-regulating social norms).
59
Gayle Kaufman et al., Post-Birth Employment Leave Among Fathers in Britain and the United
States, 8 FATHERING 321, 324 (2010) (explaining why the United States has enacted few social policies
relating to the family).
60
29 U.S.C. § 2601(a)(5) (2012).
61
Id. (“[T]he primary responsibility for family caretaking often falls on women . . . .”).
62
See Coleman v. Court of Appeals of Md., 132 S. Ct. 1327, 1340 (2012) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(discussing the FMLA’s legislative history).
63
Kaufman et al., supra note 59, at 328; Lenna Nepomnyaschy & Jane Waldfogel, Paternity Leave
and Fathers’ Involvement with Their Young Children, 10 COMMUNITY, WORK & FAM. 427, 446–47
(2007).
64
Naomi Gerstel & Amy Armenia, Giving and Taking Family Leaves: Right or Privilege?,
21 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 161, 167 (2009).
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allocations of time quickly morph into long-term habits at home. Among
two-parent, opposite-sex couples, a father’s decision to return quickly to
work automatically casts the mother as the family’s caregiving expert.65 As
time goes by, each parent’s level of labor specialization grows. The mother
develops better caregiving skills, while losing ground in the marketplace.
In contrast, the father becomes a secondary caregiver who “helps out”
around the house.66
These familiar gender roles become self-fulfilling prophecies as both
mothers and fathers come to perceive the mother as the more
knowledgeable, competent parent.67 Thus, the father’s lack of human
capital investment during the crucial period of parental leave leads to the
perception—real or imagined—that he lacks the aptitude to provide
primary care during later stages of childrearing.68 As such, the genderbased identities forged during the initial stages of parental leave yield
entrenched divisions of labor as children grow older.69 Today, for example,
mothers in dual-income couples perform nearly twice the amount of
childcare as fathers, while men with children spend eleven more hours per
week in paid labor than mothers.70
Scholars have tried to explain why the FMLA failed to yield more
gender-egalitarian outcomes.71 They have argued, for example, that men
have declined to take significant amounts of parental leave due to employer
resistance, social stigma, retaliation, coverage limitations, and an inability
to afford the FMLA’s unpaid benefits.72 Although each item on this list
65

See Iman Syeda Ali, Bringing Down the “Maternal Wall”: Reforming the FMLA to Provide
Equal Employment Opportunities for Caregivers, 27 LAW & INEQ. 181, 200–01 (2009) (explaining how
fathers assume a “secondary role” in childrearing).
66
See Jessica A. Clarke, Beyond Equality? Against the Universal Turn in Workplace Protections,
86 IND. L.J. 1219, 1276 (2011) (examining the connection between leave-taking patterns and gender
roles).
67
See Dickerson, supra note 46, at 442–43 (discussing the FMLA’s effects on women).
68
See Zhelyazkova, supra note 24, at 26 (discussing men’s failure to develop human capital in
caregiving tasks).
69
Id.; see also Brighouse & Wright, supra note 14, at 366–67 (explaining how each parent’s
perceived competences develop).
70
PARKER & WANG, supra note 13, at 3–4; see also U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, MARRIED PARENTS’
USE OF TIME, 2003–06 (2008), available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/atus2.pdf [http://
perma.cc/PQU4-ULP6].
71
See, e.g., Lisa Bornstein, Inclusions and Exclusions in Work-Family Policy: The Public Values
and Moral Code Embedded in the Family and Medical Leave Act, 10 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 77, 95
(2000) (discussing male leave-taking rates); Dickerson, supra note 46, at 438–39 (noting that gendered
social norms affect decisions related to both parental leave and parenting). For an examination of men’s
family leave usage, see Martin H. Malin, Fathers and Parental Leave, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1047, 1049
(1994).
72
See Bornstein, supra note 71, at 95 (examining structures that discourage leave-taking among
men); Dickerson, supra note 46, at 438–39 (summarizing the scholarly debate over men’s infrequent
use of family leave).
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undoubtedly contributes to the problem, far less attention has been paid to
the FMLA’s failure to target men specifically.73 In contrast to the U.S.
experience, in which the FMLA’s gender-neutral approach has yielded
gender-skewed results, other nations have begun to utilize gender-targeted
policies to help equalize divisions of labor at home. After years of
experimentation, these countries have found that not even generously paid
leave provides men with sufficient incentives to stay home with
newborns.74 Rather, these countries have found that fatherhood bonuses
represent the most effective method for counterbalancing the marketplace
harms of maternal profiling.
C. “Velvet Dad” to Every Dad: Scandinavia’s Success with
Fatherhood Bonuses
Paid leave is nothing new to Sweden. Long known for its extensive
support of families through early education programs, state-sponsored
childcare, and generous family leave provisions, Sweden stands as a global
model for providing state support to working parents.75 For example, in
1974, Sweden became the first country in the world to offer fathers paid
parental leave.76 Soon after implementing the law, however, government
officials discovered that very few men actually used the policy. Despite
publicity campaigns encouraging men to stay home, less than ten percent of
Swedish fathers took paternity leave, and society applied the derogatory
label “velvet dads” to men who took leave.77 Men’s low use of parental
leave contributed to a familiar cycle of gender-norm reinforcement in
which Swedish women took leave at far higher rates and suffered wage

73

See Bornstein, supra note 71, at 115 (discussing the FMLA’s gender neutrality); Christine G.
Cooper, The Search for Sex Equality: A Perspective from the Podium on Law and Cultural Change,
36 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 445, 445–46 (2005) (same). For proposals advocating in favor of gender-neutral
policies that encourage male leave-taking, see Ariel Meysam Ayanna, Aggressive Parental Leave
Incentivizing: A Statutory Proposal Toward Gender Equalization in the Workplace, 9 U. PA. J. LAB. &
EMP. L. 293, 293–94 (2007); and Selmi, supra note 15, at 773–74. For a sex-specific proposal that
targets women, see Christine A. Littleton, Does It Still Make Sense to Talk About “Women”?, 1 UCLA
WOMEN’S L.J. 15, 36 (1991).
74
See generally INT’L NETWORK ON LEAVE POLICIES & RESEARCH, supra note 19, at 35–38
(describing recent attempts to incentivize fathers’ use of leave).
75
See Nancy E. Dowd, Race, Gender, and Work/Family Policy, 15 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 219,
234 (2004) (describing Sweden’s commitment to gender equality).
76
See Cary Franklin, The Anti-Stereotyping Principle in Constitutional Sex Discrimination Law,
85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 83, 104 (2010) (discussing Sweden’s workplace policies); Linda Haas & C. Philip
Hwang, The Impact of Taking Parental Leave on Fathers’ Participation in Childcare and Relationships
with Children: Lessons from Sweden, 11 COMMUNITY, WORK & FAM. 85, 86 (2008) (same).
77
See Bennhold, supra note 22 (describing Sweden’s success with encouraging men to take “daddy
leave”).
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disparities in the marketplace. Swedish men, in turn, came to believe that
“velvet dads” were committing career suicide.78
Aware that the country’s existing parental leave policy caused women
to experience extended departures from the labor force, the Swedish
government made parents an irresistible offer in 1995: families would
receive an additional month of leave if fathers utilized thirty days of paid
leave that the state reserved exclusively for them.79 Known in Sweden as
the “daddy month,” the bonus depended entirely on whether men took
leave, and fathers could not transfer the bonus to their female partners.80
This clever bit of social engineering quickly produced dramatic results.
Soon after the daddy month became law, the proportion of men who took
leave during their child’s first two years increased from forty percent to
seventy-five percent.81 When Sweden added a second month in 2002, the
rate of men taking leave jumped to ninety percent by 2006.82 Men spent
more time away from work as well, with over half of fathers taking more
than thirty days of leave, and with mothers’ use of leave decreasing by an
average of twenty days.83
It is now common to see fathers pushing strollers during the business
day in cities such as Stockholm and Gothenburg. In Sweden’s famous
Djurgården Park, which lies in the shadow of some of the country’s most
prominent financial institutions, scores of fathers now sit chatting,
changing diapers, and performing the type of domestic work traditionally
associated with mothers.84 These shifts have triggered tremendous social
transformations in a remarkably short amount of time. Since 1995, when
Sweden offered the first daddy month, divorce rates in the country have
dropped and shared custody arrangements have increased.85 Horizontal

78

See id. (discussing social signals in Sweden).
EILEEN APPELBAUM & RUTH MILKMAN, LEAVES THAT PAY: EMPLOYER AND WORKER
EXPERIENCES WITH PAID FAMILY LEAVE IN CALIFORNIA 17 (2011), available at http://www.cepr.net/
documents/publications/paid-family-leave-1-2011.pdf [http://perma.cc/8BDW-YYVT]; Brighouse &
Wright, supra note 14, at 370 n.5 (analyzing the one month of “father-only” leave). Although Sweden
also introduced a nontransferable “‘mummy’ month” in 1995, men remained the primary targets of
Sweden’s family leave policy. See Ann-Zofie Duvander & Mats Johansson, What Are the Effects of
Reforms Promoting Fathers’ Parental Leave Use?, 22 J. EUR. SOC. POL’Y 319, 320–25 (2012) (stating
that incentives for women had little effect on mothers’ behaviors).
80
Doucet, supra note 21 (noting that Sweden offered men a second “daddy month” in 2002).
81
Duvander & Johansson, supra note 79, at 324–25.
82
Linda Haas & C. Philip Hwang, Is Fatherhood Becoming More Visible at Work? Trends in
Corporate Support for Fathers Taking Parental Leave in Sweden, 7 FATHERING 303, 314 (2009); see
also de Silva de Alwis, supra note 16, at 326–27 (summarizing Sweden’s father-based incentives).
83
Duvander & Johansson, supra note 79, at 325.
84
See Jens Hansegard, For Paternity Leave, Sweden Asks if Two Months Is Enough, WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 1, 2012, at D1 (describing political debates within Sweden over family leave).
85
Bennhold, supra note 22 (noting that divorce rates in other countries increased during this time).
79
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equity between mothers and other workers improved as well.86 For
example, one recent study of Sweden’s policy showed that women’s
earnings increased by seven percent for every month of parental leave that
fathers took.87 Likewise, Swedish men who took longer leaves ended up
spending more time with their children on work days and engaged in a
greater share of certain caregiving tasks.88 Although these outcomes merely
correlate with Sweden’s use of fatherhood bonuses—as opposed to
establishing any definitive causative link—the fact that several measures of
gender equity improved in Sweden after the country adopted fatherhood
bonuses suggests that these policies may play an important role in
narrowing gender-based gaps.
Father-targeted leave appears to have benefited families in Norway as
well, which in 1993 set aside four weeks of paid leave exclusively for
fathers through fedrekvoten (fathers’ quota).89 Since implementation of
fedrekvoten, which recently increased the amount of leave available
exclusively to fathers to twelve weeks,90 the country has seen men’s usage
jump from four percent to ninety percent.91 In an experimental study
comparing parents prior to and following implementation of the policy,
researchers found that Norwegian parents exposed to fedrekvoten were
eleven percent less likely to experience conflicts over divisions of labor and
fifty percent more likely to equally divide the task of clothes washing.92
Of course, plenty of sex discrimination still remains in these
Scandinavian countries, and mothers still take significantly more leave than
fathers. For example, in eighty percent of Swedish couples, men use onethird of the leave benefit.93 Likewise, large segments of industries remain
sex-segregated, and a significant wage gap persists.94 Nonetheless, it is
difficult to understate the transformations that have occurred in Swedish
86

See Duvander & Johansson, supra note 79, at 323 (examining horizontal equity among workers).
Bennhold, supra note 22 (discussing the relationship between a person’s education level and the
likelihood of taking parental leave).
88
Haas & Hwang, supra note 76, at 99 (reporting that Swedish fathers who took more leave
reported higher levels of satisfaction with childcare).
89
See Andreas Kotsadam & Henning Finseraas, The State Intervenes in the Battle of the Sexes:
Causal Effects of Paternity Leave, 40 SOC. SCI. RES. 1611, 1611 (2011) (discussing Norway’s system).
90
INT’L NETWORK ON LEAVE POLICIES & RESEARCH, supra note 19, at 210; Leah Eichler, The
Case for a “Daddy Quota,” GLOBE & MAIL, Apr. 13, 2013, at B19 (summarizing data suggesting the
positive effect “daddy quotas” have on women’s careers).
91
INT’L NETWORK ON LEAVE POLICIES & RESEARCH, supra note 19, at 210.
92
Kotsadam & Finseraas, supra note 89, at 1612.
93
Anca Gheaus & Ingrid Robeyns, Equality-Promoting Parental Leave, 42 J. SOC. PHIL. 173, 173
(2011) (explaining how women’s disproportionate use of leave depresses women’s lifetime earnings);
Bennhold, supra note 22 (examining existing gender asymmetries in Scandinavia).
94
See Dowd, supra note 75, at 235 (discussing gender integration in Swedish businesses); Haas &
Hwang, supra note 76, at 90 (attributing the pay gap in Sweden to women’s concentration in
undervalued industries).
87
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and Norwegian homes since the countries introduced fatherhood bonuses
less than two decades ago.
Although the foregoing examples may seem inapplicable to the
American context, the United States does not need to become Sweden in
order to incentivize male caregiving. Indeed, countries with economic
systems more analogous to the United States, such as Canada and
Germany, have also successfully experimented with fatherhood bonuses.
As these examples illustrate, even modest fatherhood bonuses can trigger a
great deal of change in men’s leave-taking behavior.
D. The Globalization of Father-Targeted Leave
As the first country in the world to offer maternity leave, Germany has
a long history of dealing with the effects of work–family policies on
divisions of household labor.95 Although German legislators originally
designed the country’s parental leave system with mothers in mind,
lawmakers recently began to notice how women’s disproportionate use of
leave negatively affected their labor force participation.96 Indeed, during the
past decade, female workers in Germany experienced higher rates of
unemployment and longer periods away from their careers than women in
other parts of Europe.97 Cognizant of women’s lagging workplace
representation and asymmetrical divisions of labor at home, German
policymakers drastically reformed the nation’s parental leave policy in
2007 with the goal of getting men more involved.98
Pursuant to the country’s Elterngeld (parental benefit) system, families
now receive two extra months of paid parental leave when fathers take
leave as well.99 There is no mandate requiring men to use Germany’s leave
system, but if they fail to take leave, their family loses valuable statefunded benefits. As in other countries, German men now take leave at far
higher rates due to this change. Six years after Germany implemented this
policy, the proportion of German fathers taking leave jumped from 3.3
percent to 27.8 percent.100 The majority of leave-taking fathers in Germany
now take an average of two months off from work to spend time with their
children, which represents the minimum amount of time needed to earn an
95

See Zhelyazkova, supra note 24, at 4 (examining the history of maternity leave in Germany).
See Jochen Kluve & Marcus Tamm, Parental Leave Regulations, Mothers’ Labor Force
Attachment and Fathers’ Childcare Involvement: Evidence from a Natural Experiment, 26 J.
POPULATION ECON. 983, 986–87 (2012) (examining Germany’s parental leave regulations).
97
Id. at 987 (discussing the rationale for the Elterngeld system).
98
See id. at 984–85 (explaining that Germany adopted fatherhood bonuses as an explicit attempt to
encourage men to stay home); Zhelyazkova, supra note 24, at 26 (summarizing research showing that
German men suffered no negative consequences from taking leave).
99
INT’L NETWORK ON LEAVE POLICIES & RESEARCH, supra note 19, at 129–30.
100
Id. at 132.
96
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equivalent bonus for their families.101 These results show how paid leave
combined with well-designed incentives can effectively combat gender
stratification. Indeed, the fact that German fathers who utilize the policy
now take nearly the same amount of parental leave as U.S. mothers
demonstrates the power of these policies.102
Fatherhood bonuses have worked in North America as well. In fact,
some of the most exciting developments on this front have occurred in
Québec, which recently began reserving a period of paid leave exclusively
for fathers.103 Since 2006, fathers in Québec can take up to five weeks of
leave, plus additional time that they can share with their partners.104 Funded
through the province’s Parental Insurance Plan, Québec’s leave policy
compensates men at higher income replacement rates than Canada’s
national parental leave law.105 Similar to outcomes in other countries that
have embraced fatherhood bonuses, the rate of fathers taking leave in
Québec skyrocketed from twenty-two percent to eighty-four percent just
five years after the province adopted father-targeted leave.106 Attesting to
the influence of the policy on fathers, Québec men take parental leave at a
rate over seventy percent higher than the rest of Canadian men who have no
father-targeted leave available to them.107 As in Norway and Sweden, data
related to the correlation between these policies and men’s uptake of
housework show how fatherhood bonuses promote gender egalitarianism.
For example, a study of Québec’s policy found that fathers exposed to the
new law spent less time at their workplaces and increased their
contributions to household work.108 Likewise, mothers exposed to the
reform spent more time in paid work.109
Given the encouraging success stories coming from Sweden, Norway,
Germany, and Canada, more countries around the world are adopting
policies that promote “fatherhood by gentle force.”110 Currently, seven
nations offer some kind of bonus to fathers who take parental leave, and
101

Id. at 133–34; Kluve & Tamm, supra note 96, at 1004; Zhelyazkova, supra note 24, at 14–15
(suggesting that Germany’s example shows that fatherhood bonuses work outside of the Scandinavian
context).
102
See Gerstel & Armenia, supra note 64, at 167 (reporting that American women take seventy-six
days for newborn care on average).
103
See Tremblay, supra note 22, at 226–27 (comparing Québec’s plan to the rest of Canada).
104
Id. (explaining the importance of high-income wage replacement in parental leave policies).
105
Id. at 226.
106
INT’L NETWORK ON LEAVE POLICIES & RESEARCH, supra note 19, at 78.
107
Doucet, supra note 21 (noting that roughly twelve percent of men take parental leave in the rest
of Canada).
108
Patnaik, supra note 23, at 4–5.
109
Id. at 3–4.
110
See de Silva de Alwis, supra note 16, at 326–27 (discussing the expansion of fatherhood
bonuses).
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other countries are actively considering similar measures.111 The United
States can and should join this international movement by enacting its own
fatherhood bonuses. States such as California, New Jersey, and Rhode
Island now offer partially paid leave to parents,112 and the United States’
status as the only industrialized nation in the world without paid parental
leave can last only so long.113 After all, given that international
competitiveness depends largely on a country’s ability to efficiently
employ human capital, the United States simply cannot afford policies like
the FMLA that underutilize the country’s highly educated female
workforce.114 But paid leave alone will not be enough. As the experiences
in the aforementioned countries indicate, the methods by which parental
leave laws allocate benefits between men and women largely determine
whether such policies actually dismantle gender hierarchies or simply
reconstitute them. Therefore, in order to loosen the burdens that
domesticity places on women, while encouraging greater male involvement
at home, a parental leave policy in the United States must target fathers.
II. CONSTITUTIONALLY PERMISSIBLE SEX DISCRIMINATION
Fatherhood bonuses would undoubtedly face a high constitutional
hurdle in the United States. Were the federal government to enact a law
extending additional weeks of paid leave to parents on the condition that
fathers take some amount of leave time, such a law might appear facially
discriminatory and thus presumptively unconstitutional under the
conventional approach to equal protection.115 To understand why, this
section examines and unpacks several misunderstood strands of equal
protection jurisprudence and feminist legal theory.

111

INT’L NETWORK ON LEAVE POLICIES & RESEARCH, supra note 19, at 17, 35 (describing
different systems that incentivize male leave-taking).
112
See Brigid Schulte, States Make Moves Toward Paying for Family Leave, WASH. POST, Dec.
30, 2013, at A3 (discussing different jurisdictions that have enacted paid leave legislation); see also
Nanette Fondas, Why Paid Family Leave Is Good for Everyone (Even People Who Don’t Use It),
ATLANTIC, July 8, 2013, http://www.theatlantic.com/sexes/archive/2013/07/why-paid-family-leave-isgood-for-everyone-even-people-who-dont-use-it/277577/ [http://perma.cc/FZE4-ZTBH] (discussing the
connection between family leave legislation and workplace bias against women).
113
See Nina G. Golden, Pregnancy and Maternity Leave: Taking Baby Steps Towards Effective
Policies, 8 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 1, 1 (2006) (critiquing the FMLA).
114
See Catherine Rampell, Lean In, Dad, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Apr. 7, 2013, at 18 (outlining the
economic case for father-targeted leave).
115
See Ayanna, supra note 73, at 299 (discussing the “questionable constitutionality” of mandatory
paternity leave); Laura T. Kessler, The Attachment Gap: Employment Discrimination Law, Women’s
Cultural Caregiving, and the Limits of Economic and Liberal Legal Theory, 34 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
371, 438–39 (2001) (discussing the prominence of formal equality in legal decisionmaking and
highlighting its limitations).
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Most accounts of the Supreme Court’s modern sex discrimination
rulings describe the Justices’ rigid commitment to formal equality.116
According to this view, whenever the Justices encounter a law that treats
similarly situated men and women differently, they strike it down.
Corresponding to this narrative is a related description of ongoing debates
within legal feminism. As this story goes, the issue of whether to adopt
public policies designed specifically for women has split feminists between
two hostile camps: one group committed to formal equality that advances
the “equal treatment” of women (sameness feminists), the other favoring
policies that aim for equity by extending “special treatment” to women
such as paid maternity leave (difference feminists).117 Most gender theorists
now conclude that sameness feminists have won the debate in practice,
even though difference feminists outnumber them.118
This section critiques the foregoing debate for failing to properly
delineate the actual boundaries of permissible “special treatment” as
defined by the Supreme Court’s rulings in this area. Rather than utilize a
formalist, line-drawing approach to equal protection, the Court has focused
on whether certain laws perpetuate negative stereotypes about women that
further their subordination.119 In instances where the Court has allowed the
state to act upon sex-based differences, it has carefully distinguished
between laws that presume women’s domesticity and those that do not.120
By analyzing how these decisions define the parameters of acceptable
discrimination, a new vision of the Court’s sex equality jurisprudence
begins to take form.
A. Feminist Theory and Special Treatment
By the late 1970s, feminism in the United States stood at a strategic
crossroads. Following a decade of legislative victories in which Congress
had outlawed sex discrimination in pay121 and employment,122 for example,
advocates for women’s rights had to decide whether to continue advancing
a legislative agenda focused exclusively on the similarities between the
116
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sexes, or instead pursue a more nuanced course that recognized certain
differences between men and women.123 The heated debate over this
question created fissures within legal feminism that persist to this day.124
Adopting the rhetoric of equality and liberalism, sameness feminists
argued that the law should combat discrimination against similarly situated
equals.125 According to this view, women ought to enjoy all the rights and
privileges afforded to men, and no more.126 If women received special
protection for the unique burdens placed upon them by pregnancy, for
example, sameness feminists feared that such legislation would only
fragilize women and reinforce existing biases against them. The call to
formal equality required advocates to downplay certain biological and
socially constructed differences between the sexes.127 In the process,
proponents of formal equality articulated an intuitively attractive, justiceoriented appeal: treat each sex the same, and women will prosper.128
Difference feminists, on the other hand, sought to highlight women’s
distinct experiences.129 They pointed out that even though the country
expressed an official commitment to treating women equally through laws
such as Title VII130 and the Equal Pay Act,131 formal equality in the law did
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not necessarily yield substantive equality at home or at work.132 They
contended that equal treatment ended up benefiting very few women
because it ignored real differences between women’s lives and men’s.133
According to this view, neutral rules aided only the rare woman whose life
was identical to a man’s, but did little to assist the vast majority of women
who encountered structural, gender-based barriers throughout society.134
Even though scholars often framed the sameness–difference debate in
normative terms (i.e., should women enjoy sex-specific rights?), the
conflict was actually more about strategy than ideology.135 Proponents of
both strands of feminism shared the common goal of counteracting the
negative effects of domesticity.136 They simply disagreed as to whether
special treatment would compensate women for gender-based harms or,
instead, reinscribe underlying stereotypes. Despite the robust scholarly
debate over whether the law ought to favor women in certain instances,
however, the design of the female-specific rights involved in the debate
remained surprisingly deemphasized. Thus, even though feminists engaged
in a legislative and legal dispute over the proper policies for promoting
gender equity, the discussion did not yield many concrete proposals as to
how women might actually enjoy special treatment in the real world.
The few legislative proposals that did emerge, however, say quite a bit
about the limited vision of special treatment that each side had in mind—
one that focused on pregnancy and entailed three distinct legislative
enactments: (1) the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA);137 (2) state laws
granting mothers unique rights; and (3) the FMLA.138
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B. The Legislative Evolution of Equal Treatment
Passage of the PDA in 1978 created a moment of convergence in the
sameness–difference debate. At the time of the PDA’s enactment, many
U.S. employers maintained a regular habit of firing pregnant women.139
After the Supreme Court ruled that federal law did not prohibit this
practice,140 both sameness feminists and difference feminists found an issue
that they could agree on: pregnancy should not enable employers to issue
pink slips to women. Accordingly, both sides galvanized support for
passage of the PDA, which prohibited pregnancy discrimination in
employment and compelled businesses that already offered disability plans
to extend disability benefits to pregnant women as well.141 The PDA
constituted a victory for sameness feminists who convinced Congress to
mandate “pregnancy-blindness” throughout American companies.142 That
is, the law did not require employers to provide pregnant women with
pregnancy leave.143 Rather, employers had to cover pregnant women only if
they allowed other employees to take disability leave as well.144
In the early 1980s, however, sameness and difference feminists began
to part ways when some state legislators went a step further and enacted
legislation that forced businesses to provide leave benefits to new
mothers.145 Supporting these laws, difference feminists attempted to
distinguish modern, mother-specific enactments from the paternalism of an
earlier era.146 They recalled the Supreme Court’s history of utilizing sexist
rationalizations to restrict women’s workplace opportunities during the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.147 For example, in 1872, the Court
affirmed a state ban on female lawyers in Bradwell v. Illinois because,
according to Justice Bradley, “The natural and proper timidity and delicacy
139
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which belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it for many of the
occupations of civil life.”148 Similarly, the Court’s 1908 decision in Muller
v. Oregon upheld a state law that limited the hours of female laundry
workers due to women’s “physical structure and the performance of
maternal functions.”149 The shadow of Bradwell and Muller loomed over
the maternity leave debates of the 1980s.
Although the older forms of protective legislation ended up
“protecting” women out of the workforce, difference feminists contended
that modern maternity leave laws actually advanced women’s careers by
allowing them to keep their jobs once they became mothers.150 They argued
that, at the very least, society should recognize real biological differences
in the area of reproduction.151 According to this view, if society wanted
men and women to enjoy equal access to market work, then the law ought
to equalize women’s starting positions by compensating them for short
workplace departures that result from pregnancy.152
Meanwhile, sameness feminists predicted that these protective laws
would actually reinscribe the strictures of domesticity.153 They argued that
history was on their side because special treatment had too often served as
a proxy for exclusion.154 If parental leave became known as a “women’s
issue,” coworkers would resent mothers and employers would feel more
comfortable relegating women to lower-tier jobs.155 In essence, critics
feared that maternity leave laws would recast women, once again, as lessthan-ideal workers who should remain at home.156
Ruling in favor of sex-specific rights, the Supreme Court sided with
difference feminists by holding that state legislatures could in fact require
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employers to provide maternity disability leave benefits.157 This decision
gave rise to what Martha Minow famously called the “dilemma of
difference.”158 Discussing the conundrum maternity leave laws created, she
said, “[W]e may recreate difference either by noticing it or by ignoring
it.”159 For example, any law that overlooks the stereotypes mothers face at
work might actually strengthen those biases. Conversely, the more that the
law recognizes differences between women and men, the greater the risk
that existing forms of discrimination will solidify.
Following the Supreme Court’s approval of state maternity leave laws,
sameness feminists turned to Congress for a national, gender-neutral
solution.160 Broadening the issue beyond the topic of maternity leave, the
question presented to Congress in the late 1980s and early 1990s was
whether parental leave rights should cover mothers only. This time,
sameness feminists won the debate when Congress passed the FMLA and
extended family leave benefits to men and women on equal terms for a
variety of caregiving reasons.161
Consistent with the FMLA’s approach to equality, the concept of
equal treatment appears to dominate today’s legal and judicial landscape.162
From family law,163 to disability protections,164 to antidiscrimination
guarantees,165 Congress has crafted nearly all rights in gender-neutral
terms.166 Mirroring these legislative outcomes, most summaries of the
Supreme Court’s sex discrimination decisions assert that, like Congress, the
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Court has placed the equality principle above all others.167 But despite the
legislative and judicial bent toward formal equality, the Court has also left
room for certain sex-based classifications to coexist with the country’s
more celebrated examples of equal treatment.
C. The Supreme Court’s Sex Discrimination Canon
The Supreme Court first held that a governmental sex classification
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1971
with its ruling in Reed v. Reed.168 Despite the momentous nature of this
decision, however, the Court took decades to define the precise contours of
the constitutional test for sex discrimination. For example, in Frontiero v.
Richardson, the Court came within one vote of adopting a strict scrutiny
test.169 Three years later, the Court settled on intermediate scrutiny in Craig
v. Boren.170 In 1996, the Court appeared to raise the standard even higher
when it required states to articulate an “exceedingly persuasive
justification” to enact legislation based on sex.171
The foregoing chronology represents the classic telling of the Supreme
Court’s sex-based equal protection jurisprudence. The narrative suggests
that in striking down sex-based classifications during the latter half of the
twentieth century, the Court expressed an ever-growing commitment to
formal equality. Unfortunately, this version of the sex equality canon tells
only half the story. Just as the Court rejected numerous governmental sex
classifications during this period, it also permitted many others to stand.172
Reading the Court’s celebrated equal treatment cases in conjunction
with its overlooked special treatment decisions provides a far more
nuanced understanding of sex equality. In fact, the Court never based its
decisions solely on whether laws created formal groupings, but rather if
167
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legal classifications relied upon stereotypes that hampered women’s
advancement.173 This commitment to antistereotyping, antisubordination
principles can be found both in the Court’s special treatment decisions and
in the more well-known formal equality rulings. With these common legal
principles distilled from the canonical cases and the neglected special
treatment decisions, a new understanding of sex discrimination emerges—
one that allows for equality-promoting sex classifications such as
fatherhood bonuses.
1. Stereotyping, Subordination, and Equal Treatment.—The
breadwinner–homemaker stereotype stands at the center of many of the
Supreme Court’s most prominent formal equality rulings. In fact, a close
examination of these decisions reveals a Court less concerned with
formalism than with combatting sex-role stereotypes and status-based
harms. For example, in Frontiero v. Richardson, the Court assailed the
male-as-breadwinner stereotype by striking down an armed services rule
that granted servicemen benefits to support their wives but denied the same
automatic allotments to female soldiers.174 According to Justice Brennan’s
famous observation in Frontiero, “[S]uch discrimination was rationalized
by an attitude of ‘romantic paternalism’ which, in practical effect, put
women, not on a pedestal, but in a cage.”175 In many ways, Frontiero
mirrored the sentiments the Court expressed two years earlier in Reed v.
Reed, which struck down an Idaho statute that favored men over women as
estate administrators.176 Whereas the state law in Reed presumed that men
controlled capital, the armed services rule in Frontiero presumed that
women controlled the home. Both stereotypes reinforced gender roles that
limited women’s advancement. In each case, the Court mandated formal
equality not as a means unto itself but as part of the larger objective of
dismantling gender hierarchies.
But even as the Court rooted out invidious governmental stereotypes
in these equal treatment decisions, it also left open the possibility that other
special treatment laws might withstand judicial scrutiny. For example, the
Frontiero Court gave a nod to special treatment when it noted that the
armed services rule at issue did “not in any sense . . . rectify the effects of
past discrimination against women.”177 The Court implied, however, that it
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might have ruled differently if the law had rectified those effects.178
Similarly, in striking down Mississippi’s exclusion of male nursing
students in Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, the Court noted
that “a gender-based classification favoring one sex can be justified if it
intentionally and directly assists members of the sex that is
disproportionately burdened.”179
The Supreme Court emphasized the continued relevance of special
treatment when it struck down the Virginia Military Institute’s (VMI)
exclusion of female cadets in United States v. Virginia.180 Justice
Ginsburg’s majority opinion acknowledged that once women began
attending VMI, the school would have to perform “alterations necessary to
afford members of each sex privacy” and to “adjust aspects of the physical
training programs.”181 Thus, the Court permitted special treatment for a
physical, sex-based reason (“training programs”) as well as for a socially
constructed, gender-based rationale (“each sex[’s] privacy”).182 These
minor changes, the Court presumed, would remove barriers that harmed
women without altering the school’s fundamental character.183 But Justice
Ginsburg’s acceptance of special treatment went well beyond tinkering
with VMI’s specific educational program. In a forceful defense of special
treatment, she explained how “[s]ex classifications may be used to
compensate women for particular economic disabilities they have
suffered, . . . to promote equal employment opportunity, . . . [and] to
advance full development of the talent and capacities of our Nation’s
people.”184 In other words, even though the Virginia decision itself applied
equal treatment to advance antisubordination principles, Justice Ginsburg
simultaneously recognized the power of special treatment to achieve the
same objective.
Seven years after Virginia, the Court extended its sex equality analysis
to the realm of family leave in Nevada Department of Human Resources v.
Hibbs.185 There, Justice Rehnquist wrote for the majority in holding that
Congress could expose states to monetary liability for certain FMLA
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violations.186 Much like other decisions in the Court’s formal equality
canon, Hibbs addressed the value of gender neutrality but also emphasized
broader equal protection principles as well.187 Justice Rehnquist noted that
many states at the time had granted maternity leave to women for periods
of time far longer than fathers received.188 By establishing mothers as
default caregivers, such provisions reaffirmed the notion that “women are
mothers first, and workers second.”189 Justice Rehnquist presumed that the
FMLA’s grant of family leave to both sexes on equal terms would advance
gender equality.190 Although this presumption has not stood the test of
time,191 Hibbs never considered whether special treatment for fathers might
produce a better result. Nevertheless, Justice Rehnquist’s critique of the
“stereotype that caring for family members is women’s work” remains
directly relevant to the ongoing problem of maternal profiling.192
Finally, in its most recent FMLA decision, Coleman v. Court of
Appeals of Maryland,193 the Court again addressed the connection between
family leave and sex discrimination. Unlike Hibbs, which involved
FMLA’s family care provisions, Coleman considered whether allowing
individual employees to take leave for their own personal medical
conditions also combatted sex-role stereotypes.194 Declining to find such a
connection, Justice Kennedy’s plurality opinion concluded that the
FMLA’s self-care provision addressed “discrimination on the basis of
illness, not sex.”195 In dissent, Justice Ginsburg recounted the history of the
sameness–difference debate and explained why the FMLA’s various
provisions worked together to “challenge stereotypes of women as lone
childrearers.”196 But even though both sides disagreed on the empirical
question of whether employers discriminated against women who took
leave to care for themselves, both Justices Kennedy and Ginsburg agreed
that Congress could enact legislation to counteract gender stereotypes that
hindered women’s workplace advancement. The plurality found “scant
evidence” that the FMLA provision at issue in Coleman achieved this end,
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but acknowledged the constitutional power to solve such problems when
they exist.197 Likewise, Justice Ginsburg reaffirmed the importance of
“reduc[ing] sex-based inequalities in leave programs” to make it “feasible
for women to work while sustaining family life.”198 In this way, both
Justices underscored the constitutional validity of public policies that
attempt to root out sex-based biases against caregivers.
As the foregoing account demonstrates, the Court’s celebrated equal
treatment decisions in fact focus less on line-drawing and more on
combatting stereotypes that limit women’s full participation in the public
sphere. According to the Court, the key distinction between permissible
and impermissible sex classifications is not whether a law constitutes
“special treatment” or “equal treatment” but whether “official action . . .
closes a door or denies opportunity to women (or to men).”199 Although the
formal equality decisions presumed that equal treatment would open more
doors, at other times the Court has recognized the potential for special
treatment to achieve the same end.
2. Rediscovering Special Treatment.—The Supreme Court’s special
treatment decisions have become the forgotten stepchildren of equal
protection. Despite the lack of critical attention paid to this case law, the
fact remains that at the same time that the Court announced its famous
equal treatment decisions, it continued to approve of certain sex-based
classifications as well.200 Thus, despite the prominence of the formal
equality narrative, this parallel, less-known history reveals how the Court
has rejected pure formalism in favor of a more malleable notion of equality.
a. Stereotype-neutral special treatment.—The most recognized
exception to the Supreme Court’s commitment to treating men and women
equally occurred in the realm of reproduction.201 The Court’s decision in
Geduldig v. Aiello represents a memorable example of this type of
decision.202 In Geduldig, the Court considered whether a state disability
plan could exclude pregnancy from a list of covered impairments even
though it covered other physical problems.203 Despite the separation of
197
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pregnancy—a condition that obviously affects only women—from other
disabilities, the Court held that the state was not discriminating based on
sex because the program distinguished between “pregnant women” and
“nonpregnant persons.”204 As the Court stated, “While the first group is
exclusively female, the second includes members of both sexes.”205 More
than thirty years later, the distinction between “pregnant” and “nonpregnant
persons” still elicits “pained laughter” from law students.206
Today, Geduldig stands for the proposition that pregnancy
discrimination is not sex discrimination under the Equal Protection
Clause.207 But this is an oversimplification. Rather than announce a
wholesale exclusion of pregnancy from equal protection, the Geduldig
Court simply rejected the broad proposition that “every legislative
classification concerning pregnancy [was] a sex-based classification.”208 In
fact, Geduldig suggested that the Court would have struck down a law that
used pregnancy as a proxy for sex discrimination.209 The decision criticized
“distinctions involving pregnancy [that] are mere pretexts designed to
effect an invidious discrimination against the members of one sex or the
other.”210 Although the outcome in Geduldig certainly did not benefit
women, the decision still established the crucial doctrinal point that the
Court will vet laws affecting pregnant women for any evidence of invidious
intent.
The Court applied a similar screen to special treatment in Michael M.
v. Superior Court, which affirmed a California statutory rape law that
exposed men, but not women, to criminal liability.211 As in Geduldig, the
Court found that the law did not perpetuate “invidious” sex discrimination,
but rather protected young women from the harm of rape-induced
pregnancies—a risk unique to them.212 Although the decision is laden with
paternalism, its affirmation of special treatment nevertheless was based on
the Court’s own empirical assumption (however flawed) that by
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criminalizing male-perpetuated rape only, the state law at issue could
counteract women’s subordination.213
Twenty years later, the Court again authorized biologically based
differential treatment in Nguyen v. INS.214 Affirming a federal immigration
law that required fathers but not mothers to prove their biological
connection to nonmarital children, the Nguyen Court stressed that the
decision had nothing to do with sex-role stereotypes, boldly declaring that
“[t]his is not a stereotype.”215 Instead, the immigration law at issue simply
reflected the government’s “recognition that at the moment of birth . . . the
fact of parenthood [has] been established [for the unwed mother] in a way
not guaranteed in the case of the unwed father.”216 Just as it had done in
Geduldig and Michael M., the Nguyen Court required the state to satisfy
certain preconditions before approving of the government’s sex-based
classification.
Each of these decisions sanctioned sex discrimination and produced
outcomes that were not particularly favorable to women: Geduldig
segregated pregnant women from other disabled workers; Michael M.
emphasized the fragility of teenage girls; and Nguyen reinforced the old
notion of mothers as default caregivers.217 But the Court’s rhetorical
commitment to antistereotyping, antisubordination principles bears noting.
Geduldig and its progeny made clear that the Court would strike down
pregnancy laws that reflect gender bias. Likewise, the Justices in Michael
M. explained how the criminal regulation at issue expanded women’s
opportunities. And despite a vigorous disagreement between the majority
and dissent in Nguyen, both sides agreed about the impermissibility of sex
stereotyping.218
At the same time, it would be a stretch to categorize these body-based
special treatment cases as affirmatively advancing an antistereotyping
agenda. At most, they reflect a “do no harm” approach to sex-based
classifications. Geduldig and Michael M. emphasized the lack of
invidiousness in the state laws at issue. Nguyen gave repeated assurances
that the Court was not reinforcing traditional stereotypes about mothers and
213
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fathers. Thus, these decisions embraced what could be called a “stereotypeneutral” approach to special treatment. When the Court recognizes physical
differences between the sexes, it will sanction discriminatory policies that
reflect those differences, but only after verifying that the government has
not actually advanced invidious sex stereotypes. Yet such a commitment,
although important to preventing gender-based subordination, fails to
advance the transformative potential of special treatment.
Fortunately, the Supreme Court has not limited its special treatment
decisions to stereotype-neutral laws that involve the female body. Indeed,
numerous special treatment decisions have allowed states to enforce sexbased classifications that affirmatively combat gender stereotypes. Under
this view, the Court employs equal protection principles not only as a
shield to protect women from illegitimate laws, but also as a sword to
affirm those laws that fundamentally disrupt existing systems of genderbased oppression. Fatherhood bonuses represent this new vision of special
treatment.
b. Equality-enhancing special treatment.—The law can do more
than merely swat away offensive stereotypes. In a series of decisions that
condoned special treatment for women, the Supreme Court at times has
embraced governmental attempts to address socialized, gender-based
differences between the sexes. For example, in Califano v. Webster, the
Court authorized the Social Security Administration to enforce a rule that
compensated women for past wage discrimination.219 Backing this form of
special treatment, the Court explained why the law was not an “accidental
byproduct of a traditional way of thinking about females” but instead
represented a deliberate legislative attempt to counteract the “economic
disabilities suffered by women” due to “the socialization process of a maledominated culture.”220 According to the Court, because gender norms
caused women to opt out of the workforce and perform a disproportionate
share of domestic work, the Social Security Administration could
compensate women for the depressed earnings that resulted from those
gender-based strictures. All nine Justices of the Supreme Court embraced
this broad concept of special treatment—a decision that the Court has never
repudiated.221
In the realm of sex-based affirmative action, the Court has repeatedly
eschewed formalism in favor of equality-enhancing special treatment.222
219
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Thus, in Schlesinger v. Ballard the Court allowed the Navy to treat men
and women differently under its up-or-out policy.223 Pursuant to this rule,
the Navy forced retirement on male officers who had not received any
promotions in nine years, whereas women received thirteen years to prove
their worth.224 Mirroring the screen for invidious intent in Geduldig and
Michael M., the Schlesinger Court found no evidence of “archaic and
overbroad generalizations” in the law.225 Instead, the Court allowed the
government to recognize “the demonstrable fact that male and female line
officers in the Navy are not similarly situated with respect to opportunities
for professional service.”226
The Court again authorized the state to promote women over men in
Johnson v. Transportation Agency.227 There, a public employer hired the
first woman ever to work as a road dispatcher over a man who had earned a
higher interview score.228 Deciding the matter under federal
antidiscrimination law, Justice Brennan noted that the “limited
opportunities that have existed in the past” for women could justify special
treatment.229 According to the Court, if a stereotype about women’s place at
work (such as a belief that women should not manage road crews) caused
differential workplace outcomes (such as the entire omission of women
from a particular field) then the government could utilize sex-based
classifications. Describing special treatment in terms that extended beyond
pure remediation, however, Justice Brennan predicted that the affirmative
action plan at issue would “effect[] a gradual improvement” in women’s
workforce representation.230 Under this view, a state can employ special
treatment not only as a means of filling current sex-based gaps but also to
expand workplace opportunities for women in the future.
Perhaps more than any other case, the Court’s decision in California
Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n v. Guerra reflects the transformative
potential of special treatment.231 In Guerra, the Court held that federal law
did not prevent states from requiring pregnant women to receive disability
223
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benefits beyond what other workers received. Approving of this form of
special treatment, Justice Marshall’s majority opinion emphasized that the
California law at issue applied “only [to a woman’s] period of actual
physical disability on account of pregnancy.”232 Consistent with this
language, commentators and courts have described Guerra as a body-based
example of special treatment.233 But beyond physical differences, Guerra
also referenced the gender-based demands that caregiving placed on
mothers. Lillian Garland was the woman at the center of the debate.
Working as a bank receptionist in Los Angeles, Garland took disability
leave due to complications from a cesarean-section delivery.234 After her
employer fired her following her return from leave, Garland could not
afford housing and eventually lost custody of her daughter.235 As Garland’s
brief to the Supreme Court noted, “[T]he plight of Ms. Garland is not
unique; she is one of the several thousand working mothers in the United
States’ labor force who faces the risk of losing her job after
childbirth . . . .”236
The Guerra decision alluded to these broader gender-based burdens
when Justice Marshall observed that pregnancy discrimination “is a social
phenomenon encased in a social context.”237 Lillian Garland suffered not
only from her physical limitations but also from a confluence of forces
related to caregiving and economic hardships. As a single parent, Garland
was primarily responsible for caring for her daughter until she lost
custody.238 Thus, in the weeks while Garland took “physical” disability
leave, she took “caregiver” leave as well. According to Guerra, if
employers allowed men to have children and keep their jobs, then the law
could ensure the same right to women through mother-specific rights.239 As
Justice Marshall noted, “The entire thrust . . . behind this legislation is to
guarantee women the basic right to participate fully and equally in the
workforce . . . .”240 As such, although Guerra technically involved a
232
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physical disability law, its reference to the “social phenomenon” of
pregnancy discrimination also pointed to the broader, gender-based barriers
that limited women’s advancement. These concerns remain relevant today,
even though the Court decided Guerra and many other special treatment
decisions years ago. Indeed, the Court reaffirmed the legislative importance
of combatting sex-role stereotypes this decade,241 and no case has reversed
the earlier decisions discussed here that authorized the use of equalitypromoting special treatment.
Laws can enhance stereotypes, counteract them, or at least avoid
promoting them. Most of the Court’s equal treatment decisions involved
stereotype-enhancing laws that the Court struck down for relying upon
stereotypical assumptions about women’s domestic roles. In other
decisions, the Court left intact laws that treated women differently than
men based not on stereotypes, but rather on the biological or physical
differences between the sexes. But the Court’s sex equality jurisprudence
extended beyond stereotype-enhancing laws and stereotype-neutral laws to
laws that counteracted the historically harmful effects of sex-role
stereotypes. Permitting laws that favored women in certain instances, this
approach to sex-based classifications created the legal space for more
ambitious forms of special treatment for men as well.
III. BUILDING THE CONSTITUTIONAL CASE BY DECONSTRUCTING
MASCULINE STEREOTYPES
Because the Supreme Court sanctions certain discriminatory policies
that challenge gender stereotypes, the constitutional argument for
fatherhood bonuses begins with understanding the gender stereotypes that
shape male behavior and cause women harm. The Supreme Court has
occasionally alluded to these gendered forms. For example, it has
castigated “traditional, often inaccurate, assumptions about the proper roles
of men and women”242 and challenged governmental actions that “den[y]
opportunity to women (or to men).”243 Building on these concerns, an
effective analysis of masculine gender norms would seek to understand
how the rules of manhood limit women’s workplace opportunities.
Unfortunately, legal feminism cannot fully meet this need. This is not to
say that feminist scholarship has ignored men altogether; indeed, a large
body of empirical and theoretical feminism has scrutinized the masculine
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bias of legal rules and institutions.244 Yet despite the value in exposing the
oppressive force of male power, legal feminism has rarely presented men
as gendered beings themselves.245 Instead, the dominant feminist critique of
patriarchal privilege tends to depict men in an undifferentiated light:
privileged, unified, and singular.246 This essentialized presentation leaves
little room for understanding how gender norms affect men’s behaviors or
how power disparities among men can harm certain men as well as
women.247
Fortunately, a different model of gender analysis stands ready to
explain how cultural norms shape men’s gendered identities. The study of
masculinities attempts to understand the social construction of manhood.248
Whereas feminism explains what men do, masculinities theory explains
how and why they do it. Originating primarily from psychology, feminist
theory, queer theory, and sociology, masculinities theory presents men as
gendered beings who attempt to prove their gender to other men.249
Although masculinities theory rose to prominence in the humanities
and social sciences during the 1980s, it did not attract a great deal of
critical attention from the legal academy until the 1990s—well past the
time when the Supreme Court had articulated its antistereotyping approach
to equal protection.250 Despite this gap in time, however, the study of
masculinities represents a crucial tool for advancing the Court’s sex
equality jurisprudence and understanding the role fatherhood bonuses can
play in expanding opportunities for both sexes. The three concepts of
status, stereotyping, and subordination that derive from masculinities
theory help explain why fatherhood bonuses would satisfy the Court’s test
for permissible instances of special treatment.
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First, masculinities theory teaches that men constantly seek to
establish their status as men, engaging in never-ending competitions to outman each other.251 Given the importance of status to men, governmental
policies can send a signal to men (who can then send a signal to one
another) that a decision to take parental leave actually conforms to behavior
that society has identified as culturally and morally beneficial.252 Applying
this knowledge to the Supreme Court’s special treatment test, the
significance of status to men means that a policy targeting men specifically
has a more substantial relationship to the “important governmental
objective” of combatting women’s subordination than a gender-neutral
approach.253
Second, masculinities theory provides a method for highlighting the
stereotypes that compel men to avoid domestic work. By focusing on these
rules of manhood, the study of masculinities can, as the Supreme Court has
suggested, scrutinize “fixed notions concerning the roles and abilities of
males and females.”254
Third, and perhaps somewhat surprisingly, masculinities theory
explains how gender norms subordinate men as well as women. Although
men enjoy a great deal of social power and privilege, the “straightjacket of
conventional masculinity” also causes them to engage in behaviors that
harm their health and emotional well-being.255 These behaviors injure
women who must fill in the gaps created by the masculine norm of
detached parenting.256 In this way, an examination of masculine gender
norms helps explain how fatherhood bonuses would expand women’s
opportunities by incentivizing male caregiving.
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A. Status: The Need for Governmental Signaling Through
Male-Specific Targets
At its core, masculinity is fundamentally an anxious endeavor.257 This
anxiety derives largely from the fact that most men try and fail to attain
“dominant” or “hegemonic” masculinity.258 Establishing an unattainable
standard for men, hegemonic masculinity ranks men according to how well
they conform to its definition of “perfected” manhood.259 Although the
precise attributes of hegemonic masculinity differ among groups, its
common features include strength, aggression, competition, lack of
emotion, and heterosexuality.260 Beyond these qualities, though, hegemonic
masculinity’s central organizing principle requires the rejection of any
conduct associated with femininity.261 Enforcing these requirements,
hegemonic masculinity calls on men to repudiate contrasting figures such
as women and gay men.262
Men draw from masculinity’s list of idealized qualities to prove their
manhood to other men.263 According to Michael Kimmel, a leading
masculinities theorist, these gender-based performances attest to
masculinity’s “homosocial” nature.264 That is, men engage in masculine
performances to demonstrate their manhood to other men. As Kimmel
states, “We test ourselves, perform heroic feats, take enormous risks all
because we want other men to grant us our manhood.”265
Given the current associations between parental leave and feminine
behavior, masculinities theory suggests that men’s fear of losing traction in
their intragroup competitions will continue to prevent them from taking
257

See Frank Rudy Cooper, Masculinities, Post-Racialism and the Gates Controversy: The False
Equivalence Between Officer and Civilian, 11 NEV. L.J. 1, 18 (2010) (discussing the constant call men
feel to prove their masculinity).
258
See R.W. Connell & James W. Messerschmidt, Hegemonic Masculinity: Rethinking the
Concept, 19 GENDER & SOC’Y 829, 832 (2005) (examining the cultural relevance of hegemonic
masculinity).
259
See Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 51, at 271–74 (exploring how idealized masculinity
makes men feel insecure).
260
See Cooper, supra note 257, at 18; Ann C. McGinley, Creating Masculine Identities: Bullying
and Harassment “Because of Sex,” 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 1151, 1163 (2008) (discussing normative
masculinity in the American context).
261
See Frank Rudy Cooper, Against Bipolar Black Masculinity: Intersectionality, Assimilation,
Identity Performance, and Hierarchy, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 853, 898–99 (2006) (explaining how
hegemonic masculinity rejects qualities associated with women).
262
See id. (outlining the pressures that hegemonic masculinity places on men).
263
See DOWD, supra note 32, at 63 (discussing men’s performances of masculinity).
264
See Cooper, supra note 257, at 18 (examining men’s intragroup competitions).
265
Michael S. Kimmel, Masculinity as Homophobia: Fear, Shame, and Silence in the Construction
of Gender Identity, in FEMINISM AND MASCULINITIES 182, 187 (Peter F. Murphy ed., 2004); see also
Cooper, supra note 257, at 18 (analyzing the role anxiety and competitiveness play in men’s gender
identities).

39

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

leave as long as such behavior remains coded feminine.266 But in addition to
explaining why men fail to utilize parental leave, the study of masculinities
also provides a roadmap for designing a policy that can loosen the
association between parental leave and femininity. This begins by
understanding the variable nature of masculinity itself.
Gender theorists prefer the term “masculinities” over “masculinity” to
emphasize men’s multiple, competing gender performances.267 Indeed,
many men perform subordinated masculinities to counterbalance the more
idealized form of manhood that hegemonic masculinity exemplifies.268 For
example, whereas some men may act “hypermasculine” through
exaggerated acts of sexual activity or exhibitions of physical strength, other
men may subvert the dominant norm by emphasizing their grace, style, or
artistry.269 As such, those exhibiting subordinated masculinities attempt to
reclaim power by redefining their behavior as normatively superior.
At-home fathers exemplify this process of redefining the
characteristics of acceptable manhood. Although still small in absolute
terms, the number of men in the United States who stay home and serve as
their children’s primary caregiver has doubled in the past decade.270
Numerous studies have shown how idealized masculinity forces these men
to recast their behavior in nonfeminine terms.271 For example, many athome fathers tend to emphasize activities such as playing sports with their
children over more sedentary endeavors.272 Others may stress the
importance of outdoor pursuits, risk-taking, and independence, thereby
giving their work a masculine hue.273 In the process, these men demonstrate
the contingent nature of masculinity; that is, by disassociating their work
266
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from traditionally feminine behavior, at-home fathers present a new vision
of fatherhood that allows them to assume a primary caregiving role.274
Other countries have shown how properly designed work–family laws
can expand the bounds of acceptable masculine behavior. Consider again
the case of Sweden, which in 1974 became the first country in the world to
pass legislation offering men paid parental leave.275 Even with generous
financial incentives, few men actually took leave because Sweden allowed
men to transfer all of their leave to women.276 Consistent with the penalties
men experience for violating dominant masculinity, society reserved the
label “velvet dads” for the few men who dared to take leave.277 Not until the
advent of father-targeted leave—along with an aggressive publicity
campaign that depicted a macho weightlifter holding a newborn—did the
rate of Swedish men using parental leave jump from six percent to eightyfive percent.278 Similarly, the government in Finland recently acted upon
the need to publicly promote men’s care work by offering a “father’s
month” of leave and posting billboards that asked, “How many men, upon
dying, wish they had spent more time with their bosses?”279 Recognizing
the insecure nature of masculinity, these countries have attempted to put a
masculine spin on care work, thereby encouraging men to engage in that
work.
Social norms reinforce patterns of behavior. As such, the more that
men engage in public acts of care like pushing strollers, changing diapers,
and supervising children at playgrounds, the more that society begins to
view their behavior as “normal” and, eventually, “normative.”280 In fact, the
tipping point at which masculine norms begin to change may occur long
before the majority of men actually display alternative behaviors.281 For
example, one optimistic estimate predicts that most of the population will
view men’s public acts of care as normatively appropriate when at least
twenty percent of men become actively engaged in this work.282 Although
the precise percentages may differ depending on the cultural and social
274
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circumstances, the theoretical connection between normative change and
public perception is entirely consistent with the study of masculinities.
Given that masculine ideals vary in different contexts based on social
contingencies, it is quite feasible for men to redefine parental leave in
masculine terms once it becomes clear that such behavior will not
automatically cause them identity-based losses.283
Because cultural change depends on structural support, parental leave
policies must involve both male targeting and strong governmental
signaling.284 Although a gender-neutral approach might avoid certain
constitutional challenges,285 it would lack the father-specific governmental
imprimatur that could prompt more men to act. There is a reason why
Finland promoted fatherhood bonuses with a publicity campaign that
challenged men to confront their bosses on work–family matters. After all,
who engages in the more “manly” performance: the father who publicly
embraces his responsibilities at home or the man who ignores his children
while working late into the night?286 A government-backed system
recognizing the unique nature of men’s gender performances can radically
reorient the cultural understanding of domestic work.
By explaining why gender-specific incentives represent the most
effective method for encouraging men to engage in care work (thereby
supporting women’s public participation), masculinities theory helps
provide the “substantial justification” the government would need to enact
fatherhood bonuses.287 As long as parental leave remains de facto
“maternity leave,” men will refuse to take leave to avoid receiving the
“velvet dad” label from other men. But masculinities theory does more than
demonstrate the connection between fatherhood bonuses and existing
masculine norms. By explaining how men’s current refusal to take leave
reinforces negative, gender-based stereotypes, the study of masculinities
shows how father-targeted leave can advance the “important governmental
objectives” of combatting those stereotypes and promoting greater gender
equality.288
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B. Stereotypes: Why Men Do Not Care
The study of masculinities teaches that men define themselves less by
what they are and more by what they are not.289 Through a lifetime of
repetition, the rules of manhood tell men to avoid engaging in feminine
behavior at all costs.290 Given the long-held associations between women
and domestic work, men follow the call of antifemininity by disengaging
from that work.291
The connection between women and caring for children remains
entrenched in our culture. Since the rise of the “separate spheres” ideology
during the nineteenth century, American society has largely presumed that
women are predisposed to care for children, while men are not.292 Despite
women’s success in the marketplace in the late twentieth and early twentyfirst centuries, the presumption of female domesticity remains a lasting
cultural fixture. It is unsurprising, then, that today both employed and
jobless women perform a far greater share of childcare than men.293
Women’s adherence to this norm deemphasizes male-based caregiving
in a number of ways. Take, for example, the practice of “intensive
mothering,” which obligates mothers to ensure their children’s constant
stimulation.294 From scheduling playdates, to coordinating lessons, to
designing enrichment activities, mothers remain primarily responsible for
guaranteeing the social and emotional well-being of their children. In
contrast, men experience no similar cultural imperative.295 In fact, the call
to nurture even causes some women to obstruct men’s efforts to participate
in caregiving.296 Psychologists describe the phenomenon of “gatekeeping”
among mothers who restrict the amount of childcare that men can
perform.297 Whether they do this to preserve domestic power or to defend
against male incompetence, gatekeepers control access to children by
289
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holding fathers to unrealistic expectations, monitoring fathers in their
interactions with their children, redoing fathers’ childcare work, or
ridiculing fathers for their caregiving “errors.”298
But gatekeeping alone is certainly not the central reason why men fail
to engage in greater levels of caregiving. Instead, masculinities theory
teaches that a constellation of masculine norms encourages men to distance
themselves from anything deemed “womanly.”299 This is reflected in the
markedly different language employed when describing male caregiving
and female caregiving. For example, fathers who watch their children are
described as “babysitters,” whereas mothers who stay at home are doing
the “most important job in the world.”300 Similarly, popular rhetoric
categorizes men who “show their feminine side” as honorary women,
thereby undermining their efforts to subvert masculine norms.301
Reinforcing the primacy of motherly care, many men espouse the ideal
of coequal parenting but rarely take the steps needed to ease their partners’
domestic burdens.302 Consider a recent study of fathers in Fortune 500
companies.303 In it, sixty-five percent of men said they believed in the
concept of shared parenting, but only thirty percent actually performed the
same amount of care as their partners.304 In addition, these fathers ranked
“[doing] your part in the day-to-day childcare tasks” last among six
qualities associated with being a “good father.”305 Perhaps unsurprisingly,
then, over seventy-five percent of these fathers took one week or less of
parental leave, whereas women in the study took six to twelve weeks of
leave when they became mothers.306 As these experiences show, masculine
norms may permit men to speak generally about the value of shared
parenting, but the rules of manhood keep them from translating such
aspirations into practice.
Of course, the male reluctance to perform care work extends well
beyond Fortune 500 men. Indeed, numerous studies demonstrate that
298
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American fathers spend far fewer hours performing childcare than mothers
and take much less parental leave than women.307 Drawing from this data,
masculinities theory offers a useful method for linking men’s gendered acts
to the Supreme Court’s test for authorizing certain sex-based
classifications. The Supreme Court has noted the importance of challenging
“traditional, often inaccurate, assumptions about the proper roles of men
and women.”308 Just as the Supreme Court has identified the ways in which
domesticity stifles women, the study of masculinities demonstrates the
powerful influence that gender norms have on men’s behavior as well.
Feeling that their masculinity is constantly on the line, men fear the
humiliation that comes from associating their acts with those traditionally
performed by women.309 Given the feminized nature of caregiving, the rules
of manhood require men to resist any effort to engage in more coequal
forms of parenting.
But the government cannot act upon sex classifications merely by
highlighting the gender stereotypes at issue. Rather, in order to affirm a law
that combats deeply rooted gender norms, the Supreme Court looks for
evidence that the stereotypes at issue limit men’s or women’s
advancement.310 The study of masculinities builds this case by highlighting
the real-world consequences of men’s complicity with hegemonic
masculinity.
C. Subordination: How Masculine Norms Constrain Both Sexes
When men play by the rules of manhood, both sexes lose. On this
point, masculinities theory makes the seemingly paradoxical assertion that
masculine norms both subordinate and privilege men.311 Given that gender
rules tend to buttress male power, it might seem counterintuitive that men
would have any interest in dismantling a gender system that produces so
many tangible benefits for them.312 Yet masculinities theory suggests that
men pay a price for their privilege.313 For example, the masculine norms of
strength and aggression cause men to suffer from violent crimes at far
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higher rates than women.314 Masculinity takes an emotional toll on men as
well. Taught from an early age to hide their emotions, boys who express
grief are told to “take it like a man” and that “boys don’t cry.”315 These
modes of suppression lead to deeper anxieties and stunted interpersonal
development as boys and men repeatedly adhere to unrelenting masculine
expectations.316
The same strictures affect men’s parental roles. For instance, the status
of mothers as default parents means that many fathers share a secondary,
less-meaningful relationship with their children.317 Thus, the masculine
requirement to disengage from care has profound consequences for fathers
who are twice as likely as mothers to believe that they do not spend enough
time with their children.318 In fact, today, for the first time ever, working
fathers report experiencing more work–family conflict than mothers.319 Yet
despite the fact that nearly all fathers say they would like to see their
children more often, the masculine call to avoid domestic work hinders
them from doing so.320
As a hegemonic form that seeks to quietly define cultural norms for
both sexes, masculinity inflicts tangible economic hardships on women as
well. Gender theorists talk about a “patriarchal dividend” that men earn
from masculinity’s invisibility.321 Men’s disengagement from domestic
work frees them to pursue market work without drawing much attention to
their domestic absence. The dividend yielded from men’s seemingly
“normal” or “natural” detachment from childcare allows them to work
longer hours and maintain a continuous presence in the labor market.322 All
men—even those who attempt to resist hegemonic masculinity—benefit
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economically from the marketplace gains that the dominant masculine form
yields.323
In contrast, women’s diminished attachment to paid labor (as
compared to men) causes a substantial loss of career opportunities. Half of
American women do not return to work within six months of their child’s
birth,324 and over one-third of mothers with children under the age of six do
not participate in the labor force at all.325 These departures from paid labor
cause women to lose job-specific capital such as skills training and career
development.326 As women remain away from work for extended periods of
time, their ability to earn higher wages and receive promotions becomes
increasingly diminished.327 Even when women reenter the workforce, most
can never fully recover the losses that their marketplace exits created.328
Thus, the taken-for-granted acceptance of men’s reduced caregiving roles
results in a loss of social power and workplace privileges for women.329
The Supreme Court has criticized governmental classifications that
limit women’s economic and public activities.330 As the Court has
observed, when the state utilizes age-old stereotypes about women’s
“proper place,” it “perpetuate[s] the legal, social, and economic inferiority
of women.”331 Consistent with the Court’s antistereotyping,
antisubordination principles, masculinities theory explains how certain
gender norms indiscernibly limit the boundaries of appropriate male
behavior, thereby hampering women’s career progress.
But as explained above, in addition to striking down classifications
that impede women’s advancement, the Court has approved of sex-specific
laws that enhance gender equality.332 Indeed, a decision that sanctioned
fatherhood bonuses would follow a long line of Court decisions that have
approved of special treatment for women in response to job segregation,333
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economic inequality,334 and discrimination.335 Advancing the principles
expressed in these cases, masculinities theory explains how fatherhood
bonuses also expand women’s workplace opportunities by easing their
domestic burdens while broadening the universe of acceptable behaviors
for men. In so doing, father-targeted leave represents another instance of
constitutionally appropriate special treatment that has the potential to
loosen gender-based strictures while encouraging women’s public
participation.
IV. A MODEL FOR FATHER-TARGETED LEAVE IN THE UNITED STATES
To critics of paid parental leave and fatherhood bonuses, the
government has no business funding individual choices related to the
family. After all, why should parents expect society to bear the costs of
their personal procreative decisions?336 If, for example, American mothers
decide to leave their jobs to spend more time with their children, it hardly
seems fair for others to subsidize their actions. Likewise, childless
coworkers may understandably become resentful of the enhanced
workloads heaped upon them by parents who demand entitlements such as
parental leave and bonuses but are unwilling to suffer career losses as a
result.337 The key to building popular support for fatherhood bonuses
depends on addressing these concerns.
To this point, the Article has asked the constitutional question of
whether fatherhood bonuses could withstand judicial scrutiny and has
shown that they would. It is now time to ask how the government might
structure such a policy in a way that accommodates a diverse set of
interests and constituencies. Celebrating the values of autonomy and
personal freedom, Americans have long distrusted governmental attempts
to intervene in private matters such as family caregiving.338 Reflecting this
distrust, neoclassical economic theory posits that freely made private
decisions do not deserve special protection under the law.339 This is
especially true in the area of parental leave where reproductive decisions
generate real costs for employers in the form of workplace departures and
replacement training costs. A law that places these costs on employers—as
334
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opposed to the workers who generate them—has the potential to cause
workplace inefficiencies.340
But such economic critiques carry little practical value when
conducted in a vacuum. Instead, a genuine cost-benefit analysis of any
parental leave proposal ought to compare the costs of reform to the costs
generated by the status quo. Under our nation’s existing family leave
system, the true cost-bearers of reproduction are not solely pregnant
women or even caregiving mothers, but rather all female workers.341
Because employers view all women (childless or not) as potential domestic
caregivers—regardless of whether any individual woman actually intends
to depart the labor force or not—all working women pay the price for
maternal profiling.342 In contrast to the existing dynamic, a properly
designed parental leave system would not externalize the costs of
procreation exclusively to one sex. If mothers and fathers posed the same
risk of taking parental leave, for example, employers could no longer
rationally assume that only women would depart the workplace, thereby
undermining employers’ basis for engaging in sex-specific statistical
discrimination in hiring practices.343 Certainly, employers could still
statistically discriminate against parents, but that would involve a much
weaker basis for differentiation than the current sex-based proxy.344
Because roughly eighty-five percent of men and women have children at
some point in their lives,345 the victims of parental-based discrimination
could spread the risks of such differentiation across a much larger
population. In fact, given the difficulty that workers have in signaling their
intention to have children or not, nearly every employee of childbearing
age would represent a risk of early career interruptions to employers,
thereby significantly weakening the ability to discriminate against any
individual.346
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But a policy that shifts costs completely to parents is not normatively
desirable either. Parents should not be the sole cost-bearers of paid parental
leave because they are not the sole beneficiaries of such policies either.
Raising society’s dependents is a public good that benefits all Americans.347
Although parents pay the private costs of childrearing, all of society gains
when parents raise children to become productive, responsible adults.348 As
a means of supporting men and women in their parental roles, paid leave
and fatherhood bonuses represent tangible investments in this public good.
Legislatures that recognize the value of this investment must also
acknowledge its limitations. In fact, no one policy can completely shift the
costs of statistical discrimination away from women. Even in the idealized
world of Scandinavia, for example, fatherhood bonuses have not ended
wage disparities between men and women or cured sex discrimination.349
Male targeting merely reduces, rather than eliminates, caregiving
asymmetries. Indeed, the ultimate goal of these policies is not necessarily
to achieve coequal parenting among all couples, but rather to “de-gender”
specific activities in a way that weakens the association between caregiving
and femininity.350
Given these realities, parental leave reform must represent a low-cost
proposition to employers in order to diminish any remaining impulses to
engage in maternal profiling.351 Recognizing that reform will not
completely close sex-based gaps among employees who take leave, the
government should structure paid leave and fatherhood bonuses around an
insurance-based, risk-pooling model that lowers employers’ incentives to
distinguish between leave-takers and other workers.352 The lower a firm’s
costs associated with leave-taking, the more likely an employer will
approach hiring decisions in a gender-neutral manner.353 The law can
encourage this shift by: (1) minimizing employers’ direct contributions to
the system; (2) pooling risk among the greatest number of firms; and (3)
maximizing usage among eligible employees.354
347
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A few paid leave systems emerging in the United States have begun to
embrace these concepts.355 For example, both California and New Jersey
offer men and women partially paid parental leave for newborn care.356
Modeled after each state’s disability laws, neither system imparts any direct
costs on employers. Rather, employees fund these insurance schemes
through modest payroll taxes.357 Although companies still bear certain
indirect costs that result from temporary employee losses, evidence
suggests that paid leave has had either no effect or a positive effect on
productivity, profitability, and employee morale in these firms.358
Recognizing the need to pool risk among many businesses to reduce the
harm experienced by any one firm when an employee takes leave, these
states require nearly all companies to participate in the system.359 In theory,
this system might expose small businesses to greater risk given that firms
with larger workforces can better absorb workload shifts that result from an
individual employee’s departure. But given the short-term nature of the
leave involved and the fact that businesses can fund gap-filling measures
with wages that would have gone to leave-takers, these disruptions should
be minimal in most cases. In fact, a comprehensive study of California’s
family leave policy found that small employers actually experienced fewer
negative effects from the law.360
Although the foregoing factors all help weaken the power of maternal
profiling by making leave-taking a low-cost proposition for businesses, the
most crucial variable for success depends on getting men more involved.
The government could do this in a number of ways. A quota system might
give families additional weeks of leave if men took off a designated
amount of time from work following a child’s birth or adoption.361 Under
this scheme, the father’s leave would be structured on a “use-it-or-lose-it”
basis, meaning that the government would not require men to take leave,
but if they failed to take it, their families would earn less than the full
insurance benefit.362 Similarly, the state could offer a bonus system in
355
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which men could earn additional days of leave for themselves if they took a
certain threshold amount.363 For example, if a father took two weeks of
leave, the insurance system might pay for two additional weeks of leave as
a reward.
In theory, of course, a parental leave law could offer these incentives
in gender-neutral terms. A policy might grant three months of leave to a
“first caregiver” and offer a bonus month if a “second caregiver” took some
designated amount of time as well. Indeed, some countries have taken this
gender-neutral approach to incentives,364 while others have directly called
out men.365 However, a gender-neutral system would probably yield less
gender equity than a father-specific policy, and would raise legal questions
of its own.366 Certainly a gender-neutral policy might change some parents’
behaviors. But, as explained below, father-specific incentives hold much
more practical and theoretical potential to disrupt gender norms and alter
caregiving patterns.
The nation’s history with family leave policies points to the
inadequacies of gender neutrality in the work–family arena. For example,
more than twenty years since its implementation, the FMLA’s genderneutral approach to leave has not significantly altered leave-taking
differences between men and women.367 Although the common excuse for
male inaction focuses on the unpaid nature of the FMLA, even paid leave
might not significantly affect existing trends.368 In California, for example,
363
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both mothers and fathers have had the opportunity to take paid family leave
for a decade.369 Yet despite the fact that the state has always offered this
benefit in gender-neutral terms, women still constitute nearly three-quarters
of workers who take so-called “bonding leave” to care for newborns, and
the average mother’s leave is four times longer than the average father’s.370
In short, gender neutrality has failed to close large, sex-based gaps in
California even though men have had paid leave available to them.
The study of masculinities explains why incentives that specifically
call out “fathers” represent the most effective method for encouraging men
to take leave. Patterns of behavior, social norms, and public policy
mutually reinforce one another.371 If a father quickly returns to work after a
child’s birth, his behavior serves as a sign to other men that taking leave
constitutes an inherently feminine act. Rooted in deeply held gendered
identities, these actions and norms will continue to reinforce each other
until public policies or social pressures radically disrupt them.372
Unfortunately, a gender-neutral policy would send only a weak signal to
men—a law that offered bonuses to “second caregivers” rather than to
“fathers” would encourage only those men with enough savvy and
confidence to claim the new entitlement. In contrast, reframing the bonus
as one reserved for “fathers” sends a clear governmental message to men
that society deems their involvement in childcare to be morally desirable
and socially beneficial.373 Governmental rules help publicize the
community’s approval of certain behavior, thereby creating a normative
expectation for men to engage in that behavior.374 Responding to legislation
designed specifically for them, men who claim bonuses for “fathers” do so
with the backing of their family, community, and peer groups. Given the
influence that social pressure and intragroup competitions have on men, a
law unambiguously directed at them carries the greatest potential to change
their behavior.375
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A bonus offered to “second caregivers” contains rhetorical
shortcomings as well. By extending bonuses to male “second caregivers”—
as opposed to “fathers”—a gender-neutral approach reinforces the existing
presumption that men play only a secondary role in their children’s lives.
The “second” caregiver may perform some childcare while he earns his
bonus, but “primary” responsibility for running the household remains with
his partner. Buttressing the concept of maternal primacy, the gender-neutral
system reinforces age-old frames about each parent’s proper role.
Designing a law that maximizes men’s use of parental leave has
tremendous implications for women. Indeed, if gender-neutral targets failed
to significantly increase the rate at which men utilized a new program,
maternal profiling might become more problematic. Assuming that the
government initiated an insurance-based leave system that offered some
level of income replacement, women might appear even more expensive
relative to men if existing differentials in usage remained constant.376 In
fact, the larger the gap in leave-taking, the more expensive female
employees would become under a paid scheme, thereby creating greater
incentives for employers to engage in maternal profiling.377 Therefore, even
if the use of father-specific incentives (as opposed to a sex-neutral
approach) increased men’s marginal use by only a few percentage points,
such a difference could dramatically reduce the overall risk of maternal
profiling that women currently face in the labor market.378
Fatherhood bonuses must also account for same-sex and single
parents. In fact, any policy development on this front should broaden the
base of potential beneficiaries beyond two-parent, opposite-sex households
to reduce the risk of discrimination faced by all leave-takers. The number
of households led by single parents and same-sex couples has increased
markedly over the last generation.379 Reflecting the importance of this
issue, European countries with fatherhood bonuses have also extended
family leave benefits to a wide variety of family arrangements.380 For
376
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example, Germany offers fourteen months of family leave to two-parent
households, and allows single parents to claim the same amount of leave as
well.381 Likewise, in Québec, lesbian co-mothers can receive five bonus
weeks of leave in the same manner as fathers in opposite-sex
relationships.382 These inclusive models work in tandem with fatherhood
bonuses. By recognizing the diverse landscape of child-rearing
environments, such policies maximize the number of sexes and sexual
orientations associated with family leave, thereby diluting the gendered
nature of leave itself—a central goal of fatherhood bonuses.383
In sum, a properly designed fatherhood bonus would extend leave
benefits to all forms of parental arrangements, pool risks among employers,
minimize women’s exposure to discrimination, and, most critically, target
men specifically. By focusing on men, fatherhood bonuses would provide
cover to leave-taking fathers who could point to the governmental policy as
the explicit justification for their decision to take leave. This outcome
would differ significantly from our nation’s current approach to paternal
leave, which tends to categorize such employees as less-committed
workers.384 A fatherhood bonus would help reverse this presumption, while
simultaneously forcing “traditional” fathers to confront the opportunity
losses that they would experience—both financially and interpersonally—if
they were to reject the new benefits available to them.385 By placing these
choices directly in front of men, fatherhood bonuses represent the most
effective method for incentivizing paternal caregiving and minimizing the
harm of maternal profiling.
CONCLUSION
Despite their disagreements, sameness feminists and differences
feminists have always shared the same goal of ending sexual oppression.386
United in purpose, they have differed in tactics. In the course of these
discussions, however, both sides have focused on the narrow question of
whether female-specific protections help or hurt women. Building on these
381
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debates, a new understanding of gender equality must look beyond femalecentered measures and create room for men as well.
The masculine norm that directs men to avoid domestic work causes a
large number of women to assume a disproportionate share of that work.
This disparity, in turn, reinforces age-old stereotypes holding that women
enjoy a natural predisposition to care for children, while men lack any
corresponding biological code. Women’s subordination flows directly from
these gendered presumptions. The perception of mothers as “expert”
caregivers exposes them to social pressures to sacrifice their careers, while
men, as seemingly less-talented parents, continue to compete in the
marketplace unimpeded. As the Supreme Court has observed, laws ought
not “perpetuate the legal, social, and economic inferiority of women.”387
Fatherhood bonuses would not only combat gender norms that limit
women’s opportunities, they would expand the realm of “acceptable”
behavior for men as well.
Despite the Supreme Court’s admonition to the contrary, employers
will continue to profile women as “mothers-to-be” as long as men remain
comfortably detached from the day-to-day responsibilities of care work.388
By inducing men to step out of their entrenched parental roles, fatherhood
bonuses can send a strong, state-sponsored message that the decision to
take parental leave represents a safe way to be a man. Released from the
masculine expectation of detached parenting, men can enter the domestic
sphere more freely and both sexes can operate in a world less bound by
gender.
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